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PREFACE
My purpose in writing this paper is to fill a gap.
The literature of British Military History is filled with
the exploits of various figures and armies, but comparatively

little has been done in the field of Army administration at
the executive or War Office level.

exception of

a few

Furthermore, with the

contemporary writers, the limited number

of historians of Army administration tend to concentrate on

Cardwell and the post-Cardwell era, emphasizing, not without
justification, the abolition of purchase and the adoption
of the General Staff concept.

The formative years of War

Office reform following the Crimean War are ofttimes barely

mentioned at all.

Hampden Gordon, the author of Th e War

Office, the only work which deals with the whole of War Office

history, spends only six pages

(out of 331)

on the period

1855-68, while he uses nearly 250 pages for the period 190419.

This leaves a gap in the story of the War Office, and an

important one, for during the years immediately following the

Crimean War, the War Office underwent the most significant
changes in its development.

Most major historians of nine-

teenth-century Army administration, including Robert Biddulph,
Brian Bond, W.S. Hamer, and even J.W. Fortescue h

differing degrees, either directed their emphasis
or downplayed the importance of immediate post-C
iv

in

a,

sewhere
>n

War

,

V

changes, or both.

An exception is Correlli Barnett, who in

'

his Britain and Her Army 1509-1970 recognized the importance
of these changes but did not examine them in any depth.
In my attempt to fill this gap,

I

have examined in

depth the period 1855-68 with an emphasis on the reorganization
of 18 55.
I

In looking at the changes made during this period,

have strived to determine what they actually did and what

their impact was in terms of an improved efficiency, whether
or not they solved the problems they were designed to solve

and if the changes themselves created new problems.
For reasons of time and space

I

have limited myself

to an examination of major departments or branches in the

War Office itself, especially those involved in controversy
and to the crucial manuf acturing' departments at Woolwich and

elsewhere.

My examination has concentrated on departmental

functions and duties, the conduct of their business and

problem areas.

Moreover,

I

have devoted a considerable amounr.

of attention to the area of the relationship between the
t

Secretary of State for War and the Commander in Chief, which
is so important to an understanding of this period.

Because of a lack of time, space and, most importantly,

available research material,

I

have had to eliminate certain

aspects of War Office operations from inclusion in this inquiry.

Most important among these are the militia, military education (Brian Bond has done a masterful job in this area)

administration of the Army in India and the internal workings

.

vi

of the Commander in Chief's office.

However, the exclusion

of these aspects of War Office operations has in no way

affected the course of my inquiry

'

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
As depicted by Hampden Gordon in his classic, The

War Office

,

the British Army had been used in the seventeenth-

century as an instrument of despotism and "an engine of
tyranny" by Charles

I

and was consequently disbanded by

Parliament at the Restoration because of Parliament's fear
that the Army could once again be used against

it.''"

Never-

theless, Parliament allowed Charles II to maintain four regi-

ments of personal guards.
in 1661

These guards were soon reinforced

in order to maintain public order in the face of an

armed uprising against the King led by

a

man named Venner.

This reinforcement of the guards subsequently became permanent
and a small standing army, which numbered 8452 men in 1663,

came into existence.

2

A series of acts including the Mutiny Act of 1689 and
the Bill of Rights of 1689 established a new system (which

continued into the twentieth century) in which no British
Army could exist without the consent of Parliament, which also
voted its funds.

Parliamentary consent had to be renewed

annually; therefore, even though the government, command and
1

p.

Hampden Gordon, The War Office (London: Putnam, 1935),

24.

Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970
(London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1970), pp. 113-15.
2

1

2

discipline of the Army fell within the royal prerogative, the
annual renewal of Parliament's consent was necessary for the

Army's maintenance.

Furthermore, for the next two hundred

years or so, the methods by which the prerogative was exercised

were changed, although the prerogative itself was not necessarily altered.

Parliament gradually encroached upon the royal

authority and, in many cases, the exercise of authority went
from representatives of the Crown not responsible to Parliament
to ministers who were responsible to Parliament.

4

Although the history of this process begins in the late
eighteenth-century, it is necessary to go back to 1661 in order
to gain a full appreciation of it.

In that year,

a royal

appointee, the Secretary at War, became the private secretary
to the Commander in Chief of the^Army.

In 1670,

the Secretary

at War became an official clerk to the King and became responsi-

ble for preparing and countersigning royal orders relating to

certain administrative needs of the forces.

As the King

himself became the Commander in Chief that same year, the
Secretary at War's post increased in scope and importance

especially as there was no Secretary of State specifically
As advisor to the Crown, the

charged with military affairs.

Secretary at War controlled all matters bearing on Army finance,
3

The royal preGordon, The War Office pp. 26-27.
rogative included certain powers in relation to the Army which
(Gordon,
belonged to the traditional rights of the Sovereign.
The War Office p. 20).
,

,

4

Ibid.

,

p.

28.

3

the relations of the Army to the civil community and the
general

government of the Army.

He spoke on military affairs in the

House of Commons but was not responsible to Parliament. Even-

tually though, his power and influence came to be controlled
to a certain extent by Parliamentary action.

As military

expenditures increased in the eighteenth-century, Parliament's
desire to control it grew accordingly.

The Act of Economical

Reform (1782-83) consequently made the Secretary at War responsible to Parliament and charged him with controlling the

expenditure of the Army instead of merely announcing what
amounts were required, as before.

~*

The Secretary at War's independent authority was

further eroded by the fact that, as the war with France led
to a revival of the post of Commander in Chief in 1793, the

communication of the royal pleasure was no longer the function
of the Secretary at War.

The King gave up the personal command

of the Army which he had held since 1670 and the royal plea-

sure in matters relating to the internal discipline and

regulation of the Army, including promotions, was henceforth

communicated by the Commander in Chief.
In addition, the introduction of a Secretary of State

for War in 1794 further complicated matters for the Secretary
at War and indicated increased Parliamentary desire for more
5

Ibid., pp. 16-18 and 38-40.

6

Ibid., p.

40.

4

control in the affairs of the Army.

The appointment of the

'

Secretary of State for War placed the general policy of the

governing of the Army in the hands of a civilian person who
held an office of the highest rank and who was responsible
to Parliament.

He was responsible for military policy,

military strength and the conduct of operations.

Prior to

this appointment, with the exception of the Secretary at War
in financial affairs, no one in the Army hierarchy had been

directly accountable to Parliament because the command, government and disposition of the Army were included in the royal
prerogative.

Up until the late eighteenth-century, Parliament

had tended to shy away from close association with the military
forces because of its traditional fear of a standing army.

Parliament felt that its check upon the finances of the Army
prevented abuse of royal power and that if the military and

civilian elements were united in the administration of the
Army, the military would dominate and Parliament's check

would be lost.

7

The Secretary of State for War had no authority in

regard to the exercise of the royal prerogative.

The pre-

rogative had been and was exercised variously by the Secretary
at War and the Commander in Chief, each independent of the

other, and who struggled between themselves for control of the

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State for War, with only

Army.

7

Ibid., pp. 40-41 and W.S. Hamer, The British Army:
Civil-Military Relations, 1885-1905 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1970)
p. 6.
,

.

.

5

vaguely defined powers, soon receded into the background.

In

fact, his status and power with regard to the Army decreased
so much that in 1801 he assumed charge of the Colonies in

addition to his other duties.

8

The conflict between the Commander in Chief and the

Secretary at War, who, despite the erosion of his former
authority, remained greatly influential because of his con-

tinued control of the Army's purse strings, represented another
issue making itself known as Parliament gradually encroached

upon the royal authority over the Army.

This issue was that

of military resentment at, and resistance to civilian intru-

sion in the administration of the Army.

The officer corps,

steeped in tradition, was unwilling to accept changes it

considered detrimental to the best interests of the Army, the
Crown and the country.

9

The soldiers therefore wanted to

retain the special connection of the Army with the Monarchy
in order to protect the appointments, promotions and disci-

pline of the Army from political interference
The incumbent was henceGordon, The War Office p. 41.
forth referred to as the Secretary of State for War and the
,

Colonies
9

10

Hamer, Civil-Military Relations

,

pp.

x and 67.

The soldiers also opposed any civilianinitiated reform which might upset their privileged position.
Army officers, mostly the sons of landed and propertied classes,
according to Hamer reflected in their customs and habits "the
[they] came."
tone and quality of the society from whence
The regimental mess was an exclusive private club where, again
according to Hamer, "by rigid class distinction and a welldefined ritual, the social attitudes proper to an officer-gentle
man and the traditions of the regiment were zealously mainIbid.

,

p.

6.

.

.

.

.

.

.

6

Because the civilian and military elements had remained

separate and relatively independent before the Crimean War,
the issue of civil-military relations had remained dormant for
the most part. 11

However, the issue came to the surface with

the reorganization of the War Office in 1855 which occurred as
the result of adverse public opinion over early setbacks in
the Crimean War.

The reorganization placed the military

directly under the authority of the civilian Secretary of State
for War and led to conflict between the civil and military

elements over the question of control of the Army and over
the encroachment of civil authorities into military affairs

12

Polo ponies, hounds, fine crystal, expensive silver,
tained.
wine cellars, private bands and theatricals were all character(Hamer, Civil-Military Relations
istic of regimental messes.
pp. 14-15)
11

,

"^Ibid.

,

p.

5

Purchase of commissions was also a heated issue, but
is dealt with only peripherally in this inquiry as I feel that
a detailed discussion would only detract from the main concern
and would not appreciably add to an understanding of the operation of the War Office itself.

CHAPTER

II

INEFFICIENCY, NEGLIGENCE AND THE CRIMEAN WAR
On the eve of the Crimean War, the Army was adminis-

tered by a number of separate, distinct and mutually inde-

pendent authorities who communicated with each other by letter
and who were connected only by their common subordination to
the Government."^"

The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, a

Cabinet officer, was responsible for submitting to the Crown
the Cabinet's determination of the size of the force to be

maintained and for making known to the Commander in Chief of
the Army the establishment thus decided upon.

He was also

responsible for the allocation of garrisons to Colonial possessions, for the conveyance of the Government's orders to
the officers commanding abroad and, in wartime, for the

selection of officers to command in chief and for the control
»

of operations bearing on the conduct of the war.

2

Another Cabinet officer, the Home Secretary, was
See Appendix A for a listing of these authorities and
their duties.

Great Britain, Parliament, Repo rt of the Commissioners
Appointed to Inquire Into the Practicability of Consolidating
the Different Departments Connected with the Civil Administration
Military and Naval Parliamentary Paper, Vol. 4
of the Arm y.
(Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1971 [originally
Hereinafter referred to as 1837
published 1837]), p. 13.
Report on Civil Administration of the Army.

7

8

responsible for the militia, for the geographical distribution of the Army at home (in consultation with the Commander
in Chief)

and for general military questions relating to

Great Britain.

3

The Secretary at War, a junior, non-Cabinet member

of the Government, held a seat in Parliament and was responsible
to Parliament for everything relating to the finance of the

Army and to the contact of the Army with the civil population.

In regard to the former function, he prepared and sub-

mitted the annual Army Estimates to Parliament and checked
and controlled the details of military expenditure.

However,

even though he prepared and submitted the Army Estimates to

Parliament, he did not determine the size of the force to be

maintained, which, in itself,
Estimates.

was- the

very foundation of the

Furthermore, although he could prevent the Army

or any portion of it from moving (which entailed expense)

could not move it on his own volition.

,

he

He also lacked control

over the Artillery and the Engineers and over the arms and
supplies of the Army.

In regard to the contact of the Army

with the civil population, he held responsibility for the protection of civil subjects against oppression and misconduct by
The militia had been abolished shortly after the
Napoleonic Wars and was revived in 1852. The disembodied (inA committee
active) militia was under the Home Secretary.
the
the House of Commons prepared the Militia Estimates while internal
Secretary at War dealt with all questions of finance and
(General Sir Robert Biddulph,
arrangements of the regiments.
Lord Cardwell at the War Office [London: John Murray, 1904J,
3

m

p.

7).

.

9

the Army,

Accordingly, his sanction and authority were

required in such matters as quartering, billeting and

marching of troops, which brought soldiers into contact
with civilians.^
Notwithstanding the limitations on him, the Secretary
at War, who in theory had little influence, was in practice

all but supreme.

This predominance was because of his

control of the Army's finances and because he had become,
in practice, the person in Parliament who answered questions

dealing with the administration and the discipline of the
The Secretary at War could thus interfere in the

Army.

internal affairs of the Army and in the affairs of the

various other administrative authorities as well

5

The Commander in Chief was a military officer sub-

ordinate, in theory, only to the Crown.

He was responsible

for the discipline and the efficiency of the Cavalry and the

Biddulph, Lord Cardwell pp. 4-5; 1837 Report on
Civil Administration of the Army pp. 14 and 16-17; and G.R.
Gleig, "Reform of the War Department," Edinburgh Review
Gleig had been appointed Chaplain
October, 1954, p. 276.
General by Sidney Herbert when Herbert was Secretary at War
Gleig retained this office through the reorganiza(1844-46)
(See
tion and was also a well-known military biographer.
Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College 18541914 [London: Eyre Methuen, 1972], p. 57).
,

,

,

.

,

5

1837 Report on Civil Administration of the Army p. 14;
Gleig, "War Departments," p. 276; and testimony of Lord Panmure, a former Secretary at War, Great Britain, Parliament,
Report from the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance Expendi
Military and Naval Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 5 (Shannon,
ture
Ireland: Irish University Press, 1971 [originally published
Hereinafter referred to as 1860 Report on
I860]), p. 74.
Military Organization.
,

.

10

Infantry, the enlistment of their soldiers, the commissioning
and promotion of their officers,

(subject to the sanction of

the Monarch) and for recommending to the Sovereign the officers

who were to be entrusted with commands, subject always to the

previous approval of the Home Secretary for forces in the

British Isles and the Secretary of State for War and the
Colonies for foreign and Colonial commands.

The Commander in

Chief also commanded the forces at home, but his authority was

limited to troops in Great Britain and Ireland.

He had control

neither over troops abroad nor over the supply of arms and
stores, fortifications, the Artillery and the Engineers.

Furthermore, he could not order the movement of troops without
the previous sanction of the Secretary at War.

Another major administrative authority, the Board of
Ordnance, was subordinate to the Government and consisted of
the Master General of Ordnance, the Board's head and a military

officer of high rank, the Surveyor General, the Clerk of Ordnance
The Board was responsible for

and the Principal Storekeeper.
t

the so-called civil duties of the Ordnance Department.

These

duties included the provision of all arms and military stores
of every description, the preparation and submission of the
6

Gordon, The War Office p. 50 and Biddulph, Lord
The Commander in Chief had three principal
Cardwell p. 3.
assistants the Military Secretary who was responsible mainly
for correspondence, the Adjutant General who was responsible
mainly for the personnel aspects of the Army (e.g., recruiting,
discipline, etc.) and the Quartermaster-General who was responsible mainly for logistics and the movement of the Army.
(Barnett, B ritain and Her Army p. 240; Bond, Staff College, p.
12; and Hamer, Civil-Military Relations, p. 12).
,

,

:

,

11

Ordnance Estimates to Parliament, the clothing of the
Artillery
and Engineers, the construction and repair of fortifications,

military works and barracks, and the supply of fuel, light,

miscellaneous articles, provisions and forage for troops in
Great Britain and Ireland.

7

The Master General of Ordnance directed the Artillery

and Engineers in all matters of discipline, pay and allowances,

appointments, promotions and orders regarding their employment.

8

This responsibility constituted the military function of the

Ordnance Department and lay entirely in the hands of the

Master General of Ordnance.

The Master General was assisted

by the Inspector General of Fortifications, a military officer

of high rank, and by the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal

Engineers.

The Inspector General of Fortifications advised on

questions of works and buildings in the charge of the Royal
Engineers and supervised Engineer employment.

The Deputy

Adjutant General, Royal Engineers, administered the discipline
of the Corps.

In his artillery responsibilities, the Master

General was assisted by the Deputy Adjutant General of Artillery

who administered the discipline of the Royal Artillery and by
7

Gordon, T he War Office pp. 14-15; Biddulph, Lord
Cardwell p. 6; and 1837 Report on Civil Administration of the
Army pp. 14-15.
,

,

,

o

Appointments in the Artillery and Engineers were
entirely at the discretion of the Master General of Ordnance
and were not subject to purchase as were those in the Infantry
(Testimony of General Sir John Fox Burgoyne, the
and Cavalry.
Inspector General of Fortifications since 1845, 1860 Report on
Military Organization p. 264).
,

,

12

the Director General of Artillery who was in charge of

armaments and ammunition and who advised on scientific questions and dealt with experiments and new patterns or arms.

Al

though the Board of Ordnance as a whole was responsible for
the superintendence of the so-called civil duties of the

Ordnance Department, the Master General of Ordnance ruled
supreme in all matters.

9

The supply of provisions, fuel and light, forage,

transport and money to the troops abroad was the responsibility of the Commissariat Department, under the management
of the Treasury. 10

The Colonels of the several regiments

provided clothing for the Infantry and the Cavalry and the
inspection of this clothing was the responsibility of the
Board of General

Officers.''""'"

The one remaining major adminis-

9

Biddulph Lord Cardwell pp 6-7 18 37 Report on
Civil Administration of the Army p. 15; and testimony of
Colonel W.F.D. Jervois, a member of the Royal Engineers since
18 39/ Great Britain Parliament
Reports of a Committee Appointed
to Inquire Into the Arrangements in Force For the Conduct of
Business in the Army Departments
Military and Naval Parliamentary Papers Vol. 4 (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press,
Hereinafter refer1971 [originally published 1870])/ p. 430.
red to as 1870 Report on the Army Departments
,

.

,

;

,

,

,

.

,

.

10

Testimony of John William Smith, the CommissaryGeneral in Chief, 1860 Report on Military Organization p. 268
The Treasury prepared the
and Biddulph, Lord Cardwell p. 6.
Annual Estimates of the Commissariat which were entirely distinct from the Army Estimates and the Ordnance Estimates. (Great
Britain Parliament Report from the Select Committee on Army
and Ordnance Expenditure Military and Naval Parliamentary
Papers, Vol. 4 [Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1971
(originally published 1851)], p. 254).
,

,

,

,

.

Gordon, The War Office

Cardwell

p.

7.

,

p.

50 and Biddulph,

Lord

2

.

trative body, the Medical Department, provided medical
stores
and medical personnel.

1

This brief description alone demonstrates the un-

wieldiness and inefficiency of the system of Army administration.

The Army served several independent masters at the

same time, and no intermediary body co-ordinated the functions,

orders and activities of the several authorities with each
other and with the Army itself.

The Artillery and Engineers

alone in the Army had complete unity in their administration,

serving as they did under the sole management of the Master

General of Ordnance.

The Cavalry and Infantry came under the

Commander in Chief for discipline and efficiency, the Board
of General Officers for clothing, the Secretary at War for

matters of a financial nature, the Board of Ordnance for supplies and the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies for

operations abroad.

The Medical Department also had five

immediate superiors: the Secretary of State for War and the
Colonies, the Secretary at War, the Commander in Chief (for

discipline)
_

-

Ordnance.

,

the Master General of Ordnance and the Board of

13

Such a system resulted in a great deal of conflict of
12

13

Gordon, The War Office

,

p.

50.

Testimony of Andrew Smith, the Director General of
the Medical Department since 1853, Report from the Select
Committee on Medical Department (Army) (1856, Vol. XIII, p. Hereinafter referred to as 1856 Medical Depart
359), p. 374.
ment

14

interest, multiplication of correspondence and needless con-'

fusion in the transaction of business.

For example, with the

previous sanction of the Crown and the Colonial Minister, the

Commander in Chief could assemble and send abroad

a

force of

infantry and cavalry but he could not command any artillery
and engineer support for it.

Master General of Ordnance.

For that he depended upon the

Meanwhile, the Secretary at War

could stop the entire operation by withholding necessary funds.
The arming of the force, let alone the entire Army, depended

on the Board of Ordnance.

14

The procedure necessary to issue arms to the Infantry

and Cavalry was in itself complicated.

The Commander in Chief

notified formally the Secretary at War of the requirements for
arms of a regiment.

The Secretary at War then wrote to the

Home Secretary requesting him to signify the Crown's pleasure
to the Master General of Ordnance and the Board of Ordnance
for the issuance of the necessary arms.

The subsequent letter

by the Home Secretary then became the proper authority for
•

furnishing the arms by the Ordnance Department.

15

A further example of the ponderous procedures of

administration was the method of accomplishing appointments
In fact, a force destined in the Fall of 1854 to
embark for the Crimea was "detained considerably beyond the

stated period" because the Board either neglected or forgot to
(Gleig,
give directions for the issuance of rifles to the men.
"War Departments," pp. 277-78).
15
p.

14.

1837 Report on Civil Administration of the Army

,

and promotions in the Infantry and Cavalry.

The Commander in

Chief, as mentioned above, took the Crown's pleasure in this
sphere.

He prepared a memorandum containing names approved

by him which he forwarded to the Secretary at War.

The

Secretary at War then extracted the names from the memorandum
and prepared two lists, one containing names for regiments

serving abroad, the other for those serving at home.

The

former list went to the Secretary of State for War and the

Colonies and the latter to the Home Secretary.

These ministers

then prepared the commissions and forwarded them to the Sovereign for signature.

The commissions were then returned to the

appropriate minister for countersignature."^
This then was the situation in Army administration on
the eve of the Crimean War--the first large-scale war the

British Army had been called upon to fight since Waterloo.
The system of Army administration, virtually the same as that
of 1815 and allowed to languish since then, was now put to a

severe test.

The British Army was totally unprepared to wage war

on a continental scale.

Since Waterloo, Britain's island po-

sition and her Empire had been protected by her strong Navy.
The Army had acted merely as a reasonably effective police

force capable of dealing with disturbances within the British
16

See also the testimony of Sir BenjaIbid., p. 13.
min Hawes, the Permanent Under Secretary of State, 1860 Report
on Military Organization, pp. 157 and 161.

8

.

Empire.

The Army's only enemies had for the most part been

undisciplined and ill-equipped and Parliament had seen no
need for modernization or reform in either administration or

organization.

Consequently, during the forty years of

relative peace since Waterloo, Parliament had been reluctant
to vote funds for the Army and had allowed many important

military institutions to degenerate.

In the words of his-

torian Correlli Barnett: "War became a noise far away.

The

national sense of danger, the sense of struggle between
nations, was atrophied."

1

As long as the Army Estimates had remained low, the

Army had been ignored.

Thus, at the outset of the Crimean

War, all preparations for large-scale warfare had to start

from scratch.

The several authorities at the head of the

Army immediately set to work at preparing the Army to fight;
unfortunately, their actions were neither co-ordinated nor
synchronized.

It was, as G.R. Gleig states,

"physically im-

possible for so many different departments to give the
necessary impulse at the same moment to each separate part
of a machine so complicated and yet so homogeneous as an Army."
17

John Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and
British Military Strategy c. 1900-1916 (New York: John Wiley &
Sons 1974
pp. 1-2
,

)

18

,

Barnett, Britain and Her Army

19

,

p.

273.

See also, G.M.
Gleig, "War Departments," p. 279.
Trevelyan, H istory of England Vol. Ill (Garden City, N.J.:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953), p. 198.
,

17

It was much easier and quicker for the Commander in

'

Chief to assemble and ship a force of infantry and cavalry,
along with artillery provided by the Master General of Ordnance,
than it was for the Commissariat to provide food and land transport.

Furthermore, the Commissariat had virtually lain dor-

mant since 1815, because the supply of food and forage at

home was a Board of Ordnance responsibility and because transport at home was mostly by railroad, not by horseback.

Un-

fortunately, Commissariat operations during colonial wars of
the past forty years had scarcely provided the expertise and

organization necessary for the impending large-scale operations.

In addition, the organization used by Wellington for

land transport, the Waggon Train, had disbanded in the interest of economy after 1815.

Therefore, at the time of the

Crimean War, no nucleus organization for land transport even
existed, forcing the Commissariat to improvise from the start.
The Commissariat was thus left behind in the race of authority

against authority with each hurrying the employment of his
t

charges so that the several elements necessary to render the
Army effective arrived piecemeal in the Crimea.

20

The result was that at the time of the British in-

vasion of the Crimea, the army in the field was deficient in
transport, baggage animals and supplies of all kinds, inclu-

ding medicines.
20

Gleig,

When the British landed at Calami ta Bay on
"War Departments," p. 279.

18

September 14, 1854, they had no base and no idea of the
nature
of the country ahead of

them— the only reconnaissance

Crimea having been made at sea from a distance.
they had neither ambulances, litters nor food. 21

of the

Furthermore,
As Cecil

Woodham-Smith states: "all was flung on the known, the extraordinary fighting quality of British troops.
the troops would compensate for everything." 22

The quality of

Compensate

they eventually did, but at the cost of 25,000 British lives,

many of them sacrificed needlessly as the result of the in-

efficiency of the existing system of Army administration and
of the absence of any reform of it during the forty year interval after Waterloo.

On June 12

,

1854

,

the Queen appointed the Duke of

Newcastle Secretary of State for War, thus separating the old

designation of Secretary of State for War and the Colonies into
two distinct Cabinet positions.

The only actual change, how-

ever, was the separation of colonial and military duties.

increased powers went to the new minister.

23

No

Also, he had no

separate office for his department and no mandate describing
his new position.

Furthermore, as the previous office had been

21

Dutton

&

Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: E.P.
Co., Inc., 1860), p. 169.

22

Ibid., p. 136.

Reports from Committees: Army Before Sebastopol (1854Hereinafter
55, Vol. IX) 3d Report, Vol. IX, pt. 2, p. 109.
referred to as 3d Report ABS
.

19

overwhelmingly preoccupied with colonial affairs,
no precedents existed to guide the new Secretary of State.
His Under
Secretaries were also new to their work; thus, he had
no
'

experienced aides.

Consequently, the minister himself soon

became preoccupied with matters of detail while matters
of
"paramount importance" were postponed. 24
In order to direct the war, the Secretary of State for

War corresponded separately with several authorities.

He com-

municated with the Commander in Chief on matters relating to
the movement of the Cavalry and the Infantry, with the Master

General of Ordnance regarding the movement of the Artillery
and the Engineers, with the Treasury about the Commissariat
and with the Board of Ordnance concerning military supplies.
The major stumbling block, however, was the fact that the Com-

missariat was

separate department under the Treasury and

a

was not subordinate to the Secretary of State for War in wartime as were the military departments.
In his communications with the Commissariat, the Duke

of Newcastle explained the Army's intentions and the number
of men to be supplied.

He did not interfere with the depart-

ment to any extent afterward, as he "expected them to carry
out the necessary arrangements for

transport."
O

26

In addition,

.

.

.

provisions and

the Commissariat did not report

A

Reports from Committees: Army Before Sebastopol (18 54
Hereinafter
55, Vol. IX) 5th Report, Vol. IX, pt. 3, p. 370.
referred to as 5th Report ABS
.

25
26

3d Report ABS

Ibid.

,

p.

,

111.

pp.

109 and 121.
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officially to the Secretary of State for War who was
thus not
officially informed of Commissariat operations. 27
This situation was indeed unfortunate, since it was
the duty of the Commissariat to furnish the army in
the field

with provisions, forage and land transport, the lack of which
had much to do with the appalling conditions of the army in
the Crimea.
The British established a camp on the heights before

the Russian fortress of Sevastopol, seven miles from the

nearest British port at Balaclava.

Here in 1854-55 the army

was destined to endure unprepared the rigors of winter.

As

stated by the Parliamentary Committee which, in 1855, investigated the condition of the army before Sevastopol, the soldiers

were exposed "to all the sufferings and inconveniences of cold,
rain, mud, and snow, on high ground and in the depth of winter.

They suffered from fatigue, exposure, want of clothing, in-

sufficient supplies for the healthy, and imperfect accomodation
for the sick."

28

Another Parliamentary body which, in 1856,

f

reported on th e state of supply of the army in the Crimea, con-

cluded that the death rate of the army in the Crimea from

1

October 1854 to 30 April 1855 (approximately 35% of the
average strength of the army present during that period) was

excessive and was "not to be attributed to anything peculiarly

unfavorable in the climate, but to overwork, exposure to wet
27

Ibid., p.

121.

28

5th Report ABS, p.

368.

21

and cold, improper food, insufficient clothing
during part of
the winter, and insufficient shelter from inclement
weather." 29
The supply deficiencies most adversely affecting

the army before Sevastopol were a lack of fresh meat, vege-

tables and bread, fuel, hay and straw and, above all, land
transport, to which many of the other deficiencies may be

attributed. 30

In fact, much of the labor and exposure which

the troops had to undergo owed to the want of sufficient land

transport. 31

The men themselves were forced to haul supplies

and lived in the open because they could not transport sufficient shelter to their camp.

The problem was magnified in

the late Fall of 1854 when climatic conditions turned the one

road between Balaclava and the camp into
able quagmire.

a

virtually impass-

The construction and maintenance of roads was

a responsibility of the Quartermaster-General but the improve-

ment of the road between Balaclava and the camp would have

required manpower beyond the amount available to him.

Division

Commanders, however, unanimously insisted that it would have
been impossible to spare a sufficient number of men to repair
the road and carry on military operations at the same time.

Therefore, the only answer to the problem was an increase in
29

Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Supplies
of the British Army in the Crimea (1856, Vol. XX, p. 1), p. 7.
Hereinafter referred to as Supplies in the Crimea
.

30
u
31

Ibid.

,

p.

10.

Ibid.

,

p.

7.

22

the number of transport animals. 32

The Commissary-General in the Crimea had previously

considered it necessary to have 14,000 pack animals at his
disposal, but in January, 1855, he had only 333 pack horses

and mules and twelve camels.

Asked by the Parliamentary Com-

mission on supplies in the Crimea why he had not increased
the number of animals, he replied that he had as many animals
as he could feed.

33

The real cause of the deficiency of land

transport then seemed to have been a shortage of forage, not
a lack of ships or animals.

Thus, if the Commissariat had

made proper arrangements beforehand as to forage, the situation would have been altered to a great extent.
The Commissariat displayed other serious deficiencies
also.

The troops were subjected to a diet, which never varied,

of salt meat and biscuit without fresh vegetables.

Further-

more, much of what they received was not properly cooked

because of a lack of fuel.

Therefore, the men were subject to

scurvy and diseases of the bowels "to an alarming extent."

Virtually all tmedical officers cognizant of the situation
agreed that the continued use of salt meat without fresh

vegetables increased the men's predisposition to disease and
35

led to an increased mortality rate.'
32
34

Ibid.

,

p.

22.

33

The Parliamentary

Ibid., p.

20.

A
See also the 5th Report ABS p. 377.
Land Transport Corps was later raised to alleviate the transport
Independent of the Commissariat, it remained on active
problem.
duty after the war as the Military Train.
Ibid.

,

p.

21.

Supplies in the Crimea, pp. 10 and 15.

,

.

Commission on supplies in the Crimea later determined
that
fresh meat supply could have been obtained from
the south

a'

shore of the Black Sea and brought in available steam
and
sail vessels to Balaclava.

The Commission concluded that the

Commissary-General in the Crimea was "not then sufficiently
alive to the importance of that article of food" and that
fresh meat might have been, and should have been, supplied
to the army.

36

The Commission reached the same conclusion in

regard to fresh vegetables.
admitted that the army had

The Commissary-General himself
a

sufficient store of rice avail-

able but blamed the lack of land transport for his inability
to supply it to the troops. 37

The lack of land transport also affected the supply

of medical provisions.

In fact, not until the middle of

February, 1855, was the camp provided with sufficient medical
supplies.

38

Unfortunately, lack of supplies was not all that

plagued the treatment of the sick and wounded in the Crimea.
Hospitals were totally inadequate.

They were overcrowded, undei

staffed and lacked such basic items as cots, mattresses and
straw to fill what mattresses they did have.

The "dreadful

discomfort" of the men and the neglect on the part of the

medical authorities were exemplified by the fact that during
the month of November, 1854, there were approximately 2000

patients in the barrack hospital at Scutari but only six
36
3

Ibid.

,

p.

16

^Ibid.

,

p.

42

37

Ibid., p.

10.
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shirts were washed during that entire period. 39

At one point

the average number of patients who died under such
conditions

was forty-two out of every one hundred. 40

The performance

and reforming actions of Florence Nightingale to amend
these

conditions is legendary.
Supply problems were compounded by the fact that there

was no one person in the Crimea in overall charge of the supply
of the army there.

The Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers,

Purveyors (responsible under the Medical Department, for
hospital supplies except medicines)

,

the Quartermaster-General

and the Commissariat all had charge of their own stores as
well as specific stores

(e.g.,

food by the Commissariat).

Since no one head co-ordinated supplies, the result was, in
the words of Captain Henry William Gordon, Ordnance Storekeeper
in the Crimea, that "no one knew what stores were with the

army."

One department might have deficiencies and another

surpluses. 41

Gordon cited as an example the lack of warm

clothing at a time when the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers
and Purveyors Tiad a "superabundance or at any rate a surplus
39

5th Report ABS

,

p.

385.

40

This figure was later reduced to two out of every
(J.W.
one hundred after improvements were made in conditions.
Fortescue, A History of the British Army Vol XIII [London:
Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1930], p. 156).
,

41

Report of a Committee Appointed by the Secretary of
State for War to Enquire into the Administration of the Trans port and Supply Departments of the Army (1967, Vol. XV, p. 343),
Hereinafter referred to as 1867 Report on Supply
p. 409.
.

.

25

of such articles."

Unfortunately, the Commander in Chief had

no authority regarding the distribution of
supplies and could
do nothing about the situation. 42
.

Another major problem area of the army in the Crimea

lay in the field of ordnance.

At the beginning of the war,

after forty years of relative peace, there were not enough
shells in the arsenal at Woolwich to arm the field army properly.

Furthermore, many of the fuses in the store dated

from Waterloo.

Parliamentary unwillingness to allocate funds

to the military forces in the intervening years had prevented

efficient progress in the production of armaments with the
result that the arsenal was totally unprepared to furnish
ample ordnance for a large-scale war.

Shot, shell ammuni-

tion and gunpowder were lacking, and the Government was

eventually forced to look to private manufacturers for these
supplies and pay their exorbitant prices.

In the end, England

even had to turn to foreign sources, as private British

manufacturers could not meet the demand.
42

Ibid., p. 430.
Eventually, near the end of the war,
all stores in the Crimea were consolidated under the Ordnance
Department to the "great relief" of the troops there.
(Testimony of Major Arthur Leahy, Deputy Assistant QuartermasterGeneral in the Crimea, 1867 Report on Supply p. 531). Captain
Gordon directed the operation and was accountable only to the
General Officer Commanding in the Crimea.
(Testimony of Gordon,
1860 Report on Military Organization p. 509 and testimony of
Gordon, 1867 Report on Supply p. 4 09)
,

,

,

A

O

Andrew Wynter, "Woolwich Arsenal and its Manufacturing Establishments," London Quarterly Review January, 1858,
England got 44,000 guns, 3000 cavalry swords and 12,000
p. 122.
barrels of powder from Liege and 20,000 barrels of powder from
the United States.
,

"

The Crimean War was unique in that military corres-

pondents living with the troops in the field, using the
steamship and the railroad, brought news of the war to
Britain much quicker than had been possible before.

The

result was that the experiences of the troops before Sevastopol and the workings of the military system became known and

consequently unacceptable to the English public.

As Correlli

Barnett states: "For the first time in history the nation

knew what its soldiers were going through, and cared. 44
The Government in power, especially the Duke of New-

castle, necessarily bore the brunt of the public's wrath and

had to answer for the sins of previous governments which had
for forty years neglected the Army.

This was unfortunate in

that the fault clearly lay with the system of administration
itself, much more so than with its administrators

,

and with

Parliament for having allowed the system to remain in a state
of such torpor for so long.

Nonetheless, the end result of

the public outcry was the resignation of the Government in

January, 1855, and the hurried reorganization of Army adminis-

tration by its successor.
44

45

Barnett, Britain and Her Army

,

45

p.

285.

Trevelyan, History of England III, p. 200 and
The reorganization
Fortescue, British Army XIII, p. 162.
Sevascame too late to be of any real impact in the Crimea.
topol finally fell in Sept^ ber, 1855, and a peace was signed
on March 30, 1856.
,

,

CHAPTER

III

REORGANIZATION 1855-1860
General

After the unfortunate scapegoats had departed, the new

Government under Lord Palmerston had to rectify quickly the
situation or risk suffering the same fate as its predecessor.
The incoming ministers therefore chose to reorganize the

system of Army administration immediately, notwithstanding
the fact that the midst of a Continental war was not neces-

sarily the best time to do so.

Consequently, the reorganiza-

tion was hasty and was effected without a general overall plan

with defined principles.

It was

,

as the noted historian of

the British Army, J.W. Fortescue, states, a headlong expedient

of "a Cabinet of terrified men, anxious to still popular

clamour and eager to show that they were doing something.""'"
They did more than just "something."

By the time they were

through, the upper levels of Army administration were, to

outward appearances at least, completely overhauled.
Actually, the reorganization had begun under the

previous Government with the transfer in December, 1854, of
the Commissariat from the Treasury to the War Department.
"'"Fortescue,

British Army

,

2

XIII, p. 171.

The War Department was the name used to refer to the
office of the Secretary of State for War the War Office was

—

27

"

,
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However, not until the advent of the new Government were
other

changes made.

In an attempt to meet the most obvious need of

the Army, namely, a unifying force to pull together all the

various elements of Army administration in order to more

effectively supervise and direct the preparedness and operations of the Army, the new Government made the most important

innovation of all.

In February, 1855, one man, Lord Panmure

(formerly Fox Maule) was appointed to be both Secretary at

War and Secretary of State for War thus effectively combining
the offices into one

— the

Secretary of State for War.

Panmure

had felt that the condition of the army before Sevastopol
was "solely to be attributed to the want of proper control
by a single Minister of every department of the Army."

There-

fore, he became the guiding force for the consolidation of

the two offices.

He saw the combination of the offices as

being necessary for the "more speedy transaction of business,
and for giving the servant of the Crown who was responsible
for military administration, more defined and more extended
4
powers than he had under the old system as Secretary at War."

A Royal Patent issued in May, 1855, made the consolidation of
Not until
the Secretary at War's office.
ment headed by the Secretary of State for
(Gordon, The War Office
the War Office.
people, though, continued to refer to the
,

Department

1857 did the establish
War become known as
Many
pp. 51-52).
War Office as the "War

.

3

Sir George Douglas and Sir George Dalhousie Ramsay, eds
The Panmure Papers Vol. I (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1908),
pp. 47-48.
,

testimony of Lord Panmure, 1860 Report on Military
Organization

p.

74.

,

.

the positions official.

The next major change involved the Board of Ordnance.

Lord Panmure engineered its abolition so that the Secretary
of
State for War could present to the House of Commons in one

view and in one estimate the entirety of the country's military
expenses, instead of having three separate estimates as

before (the Secretary at War for the Army of the Line, the
Master General of Ordnance for the Artillery and the Scientific Corps, and the Treasury for the Commissariat).

Further-

more, Panmure had found that when he was Secretary of State
for War and the old Board of Ordnance still existed, he had

had to go through a "vast system" of correspondence just to

communicate orders.

He felt it would be better if the Secre-

tary of State for War could issue these orders directly himself.

Moreover, by controlling the departments which executed

these orders, he would attain greater speed and efficiency.

Consolidation with his office would also enable the Secretary
of State for War to ascertain immediately the condition of
?

the warlike stores and all the other types of stores.

6

Consequently, an Order in Council of June, 1855,

abolished the Board and, in its place, several officers were
c

"Extract from Third Part Patent Roll of the Eighteenth
year of the Reign of Queen Victoria, 22 May 1855," 1860 Report
on Military Organization Appendix 2, p. 610.
,

testimony of Lord Panmure, 1860 Report on Military
Organization

pp.

81-82 and 89

.

^
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appointed heads of departments under the Secretary of State
for War

(Appendix

B)

'

The military command of the Artillery

.

was transferred to the Commander in Chief, but the Inspector

General of Fortifications, now directly responsible to the

Secretary of State for War, retained the command of the
Engineers.

The Inspector General of Fortifications also

functioned as an adviser to the Secretary of State for War on

questions of maintenance and improvement of fortifications and
on construction of barracks and other buildings.

His duties

as an adviser thus essentially dealt with the so-called

civil side of Engineer functions while his other duties as

commander of the Royal Engineers dealt with military matters.
The Secretary of State for War also retained the position of

Director General of Artillery to advise on artillery and
*

•

ammunition

9

7

Order in Council, dated June 6, 1855, 1860 Report on
Military Organization Appendix 1, pp. 595-98. The business
connected with both the Medical Department and the Home Department (regarding the Militia) had been transferred to the War
Department soon after Panmure took office.
,

g

Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, the Permanent Under
Secretary of State, 1860 Report on Military Organization p. 123.
,

Q

The Secretary of State for War also appointed a Naval
Director of Artillery to advise on naval ordnance because the
Manufacturing Departments at Woolwich, formerly under the Board
of Ordnance and now under the Secretary of State for War, produced naval armaments as well as those of the Army. The position
did not endure long, however. As the job actually entailed
little work, in an economy move, the Director, Navy Captain J.C.
Caff in, was also appointed the Director General of Stores and
Clothing in 1857. This was a new position resulting from the
amalgamation of the Stores and Clothing departments. Caff in
retained the duties of his former position in his new one even
though the formal position of Naval Director of Artillery was

.
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The Director General of Stores assumed the bulk
of
the duties of the former Principal Storekeeper.

'

These duties

mainly dealt with the superintendence of actions regarding
the
receipt, custody, control and issue of military stores.

The

Director General of Contracts supplied all military and other
stores by means of public competition and contracts and super-

intended the execution of all agreements made by him up to the
time of their final completion.

The Director General of Army

Clothing provided clothing to the Army.
Officers was therefore eliminated.

The Board of General

Lastly, the Accountant

General now controlled, audited and brought to account the

entire receipts and expenditure of Army administration. 10

Although the clerical staffs of the various departments were consolidated in the Secretary of State for War's

Office in January, 1856, the new organization was not official
fixed until February, 1857, by an Order in Council.

The posi-

tions of Clerk of Ordnance, Deputy Secretary at War, Naval

Director of Artillery and Director General of Clothing were

eliminated

and*

an Assistant Under Secretary of State and a

Secretary for Military Correspondence were added.

Also, the

Director General of Stores' duties were expanded to include
(Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
eliminated.
Military Organization p. 121)
,

10

Order in Council, dated June 6, 1855, 1860 Report
on Military Organization, Appendix 1, pp. 595-98.

.

3

.

.
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the superintendence of clothing. 11

The War Office was further consolidated by the establish

ment of its various departments in 1858 under one roof in Pall
Mall, except for the Medical Department and the Inspector

General of Fortifications' Office which were located at Whitehall.

The most obvious and important exception though was the

Commander in Chief's office which remained at the Horse
Guards

At this time it is possible to make

a

general compari-

son of cost and personnel between the old and the new organiza

tions
In terms of economy,

the British nation any money.

the reorganization did not save
The chart below details the

cost of the military control establishment from two years

before the consolidation to four years after it using
1855 as the basic year of the union.

1

Order in Council, dated February 2, 18 57. Panmure
retained the Clerk of Ordnance to provide continuity of adminis1860 Report
tration between the old and new organizations.
The organization and duties
on Military Organization p. 86)
of each of the departments thus fixed are indicated in Appendix C.
(

,

Gordon, The War Office, p. 58, and testimony of Sir
Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on Military Organization p. 129.
The term "Horse Guards" referred to the Commander in Chief's
office.
The Horse Guards was the name given to a building near
Whitehall in London located on the grounds where Charles II had
housed his mounted troops. Before the reorganization, the office
of the Secretary of War, as well as that of the Commander in Chief,
(Gordon, The War Office p. 31)
was located there.
,

,
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Returns of the Annual Establishment Charges of the

33

War
Dept.

War
Office

Ord.
Dept.

h

h

h

h

32,947

65,484

4996

13,537

116,964

983

36,760

62,268

4678

14,569

127, 658

1855- 56

22,932

49,053

70,873

5082

16.559

164 ,499

1856- 57

179,878

1857- 58

166,968

166,968

1858- 59

169,029

169,029

1853- 54

1854- 55

9.

Commissariat

Miscellaneous

Total

h

h

i>—

179.878

As indicated, there is a difference of more than h

50,000 in cost between 1853-54, when there was peace and the

Army was administered under the old system, and 1858-59 when
there was again peace but the Army was under new organization.
The increase in cost resulted from several factors.

First and

foremost, the increased business caused by the Crimean War

necessitated the hiring of additional temporary personnel to
assist permanent clerks with the workload.

In 1855, there-

fore, before the consolidation of clerical staffs under the

Secretary of State for War, there were 506 clerks (321 permanent, 185 temporary) employed in the various departments.
a result of the

As

hiring of temporary clerks, by 1855-56 the cost

of the establishment had risen nearly h 50,000 and it remained

Departments now Consolidated in that of War, for Four Year s
previous to their Consolidation: And, of the Annual Establish ment Charges of the Department of War since such Consolidation
up to the present~Time (1857-58, Vol. XXXVII, p. 589), p. 589
and "An Account of the Annual Charge of the United Establishment," 1860 Report on Military Organization Appendix 2, p.
These figures do not include the Commander in Chief's office.
626.
,
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relatively constant for the next three years, even though
1858-59 was a year of virtual peace.

Although the increased

business cawed by the Indian Mutiny in 1857-58 required the

retention of the temporary clerks, the real reason that costs

remained high was the result of the organization itself.

The

formation of the consolidated War Office under the Secretary
of State for War greatly increased the workload of that office.

The formation of the Clothing Department alone justified the

maintenance of

a large

clerical staff.

However, when the

increased business caused by the formation of this one department was combined with the increases occasioned by the transfer
of business from other offices to the War Office, along with
the other inherent business of the office, the increase in

volume was enormous and a larger staff became a necessity. 14
As a result, clerical personnel were not released after hostili-

ties in India were concluded and, in 1859, there were 513

clerks employed in the War Office.

15

The number and total salaries of principal officers

supervisory personnel, department heads and principal

(i.e.,

secretaries) also remained remarkably stable throughout the
period.

The chart below depicts the changes in the upper ranks

In 1853 a total of 162,088 letters were received and
201,000 were written by the several departments administering the
Army.
In 1859, 332,631 letters were received by the War Office
1860 Report on Military Organization
and 518,906 were written.
pp. 124-25 [testimony of Hawes] and Appendix 10, p. 707 ["Statement of the Number of Letters Received and Written"]).
.

(

15

,

1860 Report on Military Organization, Appendix 2, p.
Of the 513 clerks employed in 1859-60, 328 were permanent
626.
1860 Report on Military Or ganization,
and 18 5 were temporary.
Appendix 2, p. 625).
(

6
8

9
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of Army administration (except for the Commander
in Chief •s
office)

'

from 1854 to 1859 in terms of total salary
differences

and numbers of positions eliminated and added. 16

Positions Positions
added
eliminated Add/e lim positions
number of total
total
total
net re- net diff
positions salaries # salary # salary suit
in salary
1854

25

£26, 323

1856

30

£33,200

1859

29

£32,585

—

17

13 £17,327

8

£12,080

+5

+£5247

£ 8,485

9

£10,500

-1

-£2015 18

8

In terms of numbers then, principal officers did not

undergo a drastic change during the reorganization.
terms of salary, there was

onJLy a

Even in

£6000 difference between

1854 and 1859, £2000 of which can be attributed to salary

increases in retained positions.

The largest single addition

to the salary figures was the Secretary of State for War at

£5000 annually, while the largest single elimination was the

Master General or Ordnance at £3000 per year.

1

The real turbulence in the ranks of the principal

officers came in the designation of their positions.
1

pp.

1860 Report on Military Organization
627-28.

,

For

Appendix

2,

17

The discrepancy between the sum of this figure and
the figure listed as "total salaries" for 1854 with that listed
for "total salaries" for 1856 is the result of salary increases
totalling £1630 in retained positions.
1

The discrepancy between the sum of this figure and
the figure listed as "total salaries" for 1856 with that listed
for "total salaries" for 1859 is the result of salary increases
totalling £1400 in retained positions.
19
p.

628.

1860 Report on Military Organization, Appendix

2,

example, only twelve of the twenty five positions
extant in
1854 still existed in 1859. 20

'

Seventeen of the twenty five

positions survived in 1856, but thirteen new ones were
added,
thereby altering the structure of the War Department
sub-

stantially.

However, even though a number of designations

were new, many of the principal office-holders were not newcomers to the Army's administrative apparatus.

For example,

the Secretary of State for War, Lord Panmure, had been the

Secretary at War from 184 6 to 1852.

The Accountant General,

Mr. Kirby, had been the Chief Examiner in the Secretary at

War's Office before the reorganization and, in his new position, he was responsible for vitually the same duties as

before, albeit with several additions.

The Assistant

Director of Clothing, Mr. Ramsay, had been the Private Secretary to Sidney Herbert, the Secretary at War from 1852 to
1854, and had assisted in the introduction of the new method

of clothing the Army.

Furthermore, Mr. Monsell, the Clerk of

Ordnance; Sir Benjamin Hawes

,

the Deputy Secretary at War;

General Sir John Fox Burgoyne, the Inspector General of Forti
20

Two private secretaries, three members of the Inspector General of Fortification's office, the Director of Surveys,
the Director General of the Army Medical Department, two members
of the Military Superintendent of Pensioners' office, the
Chaplain General and two members of the Solicitor's office.
1860 Report on Military Organization Appendix 2, p. 628).
(

,

21

Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
Military Organization p. 121 and Great Britain, Parliament,
Second Report of a Committee Appointed to enquire into the
Organization of the War Office Military and Naval Parliamentary
Papers, Vol. .4 (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1971
Hereinafter referred to a
[originally published 1864]), p. 331.
1864 War Office.
,

.

37

fications; Sir Alexander Tullock, the Superintendent of Pen-'
sioners; Andrew Smith, the Director General of the Medical

Department; and Lord Hardinge, the Commander in Chief; all

held their positions before the reorganization and retained

them after it in virtually the same form. 22

In conclusion,

the reorganization resulted in in-

creased expense, in virtually no change in the total number
of personnel employed in Army administration and in little

immediate infusion of new personalities into the Army hierarchy.

Therefore, analysis of the reorganization must proceed

beyond mere numbers and personalities in order to determine and
assess real changes.

Correspondence and the Conduct of Business
within the War Office
After the reorganization, the War Office received and

generated an immense amount of correspondence.
22

23

The conduct

*

1860 Report on Military Organization pp. 73, 86,
115, 121, 124, 179 and 348; 1856 Medical Department p. 374;
and Woodham- Smith The Reason Why p. 130. Mr. Howell, the
Director of Contracts, and John R. Godley, The Director General
1860 Report on
of Stores, were new to Army administration.
Military Organization pp. 120 and 179). The Director of
Clothing, Sir T. Troubridge, had been appointed by Panmure after
losing both legs at the Battle of Inkerman while serving with
Panmure Papers
(Douglas and Ramsay, eds
the 7th Fusiliers.
Available information on the remaining few officeI, p. 227).
holders immediately before and after the reorganization is vague
and no conclusions can be made as to their status.
,

,

,

,

(

,

.

23

,

,

Incoming correspondence averaged between 900 and 1000
letters a day in 1859 while outgoing correspondence averaged
See footnote 14 above.
nearly 1500 letters a day.

:

.

,
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of its business necessarily revolved around this correspondence

and was governed by a complicated system of receipt, registration, dissemination and response.

All correspondence for the War Office arrived in the

Registry room in Pall Mall where it was opened, registered
and distributed to the proper office, or offices, for action. 24
Upon receipt in the appropriate office, or offices, a letter
was first examined by a junior clerk (or several junior clerks)
and passed on to the department head.

The department head

would then forward it, if necessary, to one of the Under
Secretaries of State or to the Secretary for Military Corres-

pondence according to a scheme approved by Lord Panmure in
August, 1857.

25

By this arrangement the Assistant Under

Secretary of State handled financial subjects, stores, clothing
and contracts, the Permanent Under Secretary of State took

political and miscellaneous subjects and office arrangements,
and the Secretary for Military Correspondence the military

and professional sub j ects

.

Thus

,

according to this scheme

the proper reporting channels for major department heads

were as follows
Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
Military Organization pp. 127-28. The system of registration
used was the same as that used in the old Secretary at War's
office albeit modified and improved.
,

25

Memorandum Number 121, War Office, 8 August 1857, 136
Report on Military Organization, Appendix 1, p. 60 0. Panmure
established the position of Secretary for Military Correspondence to correspond principally with the Military Secretary
at the Horse Guards upon all matters relating to discipline,
the distribution and movement of troops and other military
matters

Director of Stores and Clothing

Assistant Under Secretary of State

Director of Contracts

Assistant Under Secretary of State

Inspector General
of Fortifications

Chaplain General and Inspector General of Schools

Permanent Under Secretary of State
Permanent Under Secretary of State

Commissary General

Permanent Under Secretary of State

Solicitor

Permanent Under Secretary of State

Director General of Artillery

Secretary for Military Correspondence

Military Superintendent
of Pensioners

Secretary for Military Correspondence

The eventual limit of any one item's progression from

bottom to top was determined by its import.

Thus, letters

of importance eventually went to the Secretary for War by
the appropriate person for decision.

Papers were transferred

from one person to the next by the transmission of the

papers (letters) themselves via an elaborate system of
minuting, which was nothing more than the independent writing
of opinions without discussion on the issues involved.

Each

person who handled the correspondence (except for registration
and distribution) placed his comments either on the letter

itself or on an additional sheet (or sheets) and then for-

warded the whole to the next indicated person in the chain

40

as necessary. 26

Documents thereby often ended up much more

'

voluminous than when they arrived at the War Office.

When a decision relating to a letter was made, a
junior clerk in an appropriate office prepared the answer and

submitted it to the proper person for signature according to
a

signature scheme approved by Lord Panmure. 27
As explained by Sir Benjamin Hawes

this elaborate

,

system served as a screening process which offered the Secretary for War the benefit of systematic advice from his subor-

dinates.

"Nothing secures the Secretary of State so much

against any possible error in an important case," he stated,
"as its having come under the deliberate review of the seniors

or heads of branches

,

men most experienced in the office, and

the Under Secretaries." 2 8

Hawes felt that the system worked

well and the business of the War Office was "tolerably successfully conducted" by a "good classification of business, a

good subdivision of labour, and a continual and cordial co-

operation

.

.

.

[within the War Office]."

29

He pointed

26

Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on Military
Organization pp. 110, 127-28 and 130-31. Documents of great importance or those requiring immediate attention were forwarded
directly to an Under Secretary or to the Secretary for War if neccessary by the Registrar.
1860 Report on Military Organization
,

,

(

p.

133).

The terms "Secretary of State for War" and "Secretary for
War" are interchangeable and refer to the same person.
27

Memorandum Number 202, War Office, 15 January 1858, 1860
For
Report on Military Organization Appendix 1 pp 6 01-0 3
example, letters conveying directly the Queen's pleasure to an
officer of state or the Commander in Chief were to be signed by the
Letters to Members of Parliament were to be
Secretary for War.
signed by the Parliamentary Under Secretary and letters addressed t
persons holding the equivalent rank of Under Secretary or to key
General Officers were to be signed by the Permanent Under Secretary
28
Ibid.,p.l36.
1860 Ropo rt on Military O rganization, p. 131.
,

,

.

.
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out that the average time necessary to process a letter (open,
register, distribute, attach former correspondence relating
to the same subject, examination by appropriate branch or

branches, minute, write answer, signature, copy and register)

was four days. 30
Hawes had been employed as the Deputy Secretary at

War before the reorganization, and he compared the average
time of answering correspondence in the reorganized War

Office favorably with that of his former office.

In fact,

in

1859, he told the Parliamentary Committee on military organi-

zation that, "I am inclined to think that they [letters] are

answered more promptly, if you take the average of a large
number."

He attributed this promptness to the fact that in

the old War Office, a paper was not considered in arrears

until it had been in the office for fourteen days; thus,

people were not under pressure to react promptly.

Furthermore,

the Crimean War had caused an influx of inexperienced temporary

clerks which resulted in a slowdown of work until the clerks
31

gained experience and the new organization stabilized itself."
Thus, in terms of efficiency in handling correspon-

dence, the reorganized War Office apparently more than held
its own in comparison to its predecessor

— an

admirable

achievement when one takes into account the increased size
and complexity of the reorganized office and the enormous

increase in the amount of correspondence between 1853 (363,008
30

Ibid., p. 132.

31

Ibid., pp. 133-34.

.

.

"

letters written or received by the departments administering'
the Army) and 1859

(851,537 letters written or received by the

War Office) 32
.

Not everyone was as enthusiastic about the system as

Hawes, however.

That it was not universally accepted is evi-

denced by dissension over it within senior ranks of the War
Office itself.

The major complaint, and a well founded one,

was that the system was simply too complex.

John William

Smith, the Commissary General, voiced this view in 1859.

Although the average time of answering correspondence compared
•

favorably with the past, Smith felt that the time occupied
in the transaction of business in the War Office was still

"much slower than it ought to be
to be extremely defective.

...

I

consider [the system]

33

As an example of how the system often delayed busi-

ness by elaborate handling of minute matters, Smith cited the

case of a request by his department to increase the salary
of a messenger in Malta by a penny a day.

As he did not him-

self have the authority to sanction such a raise, Smith sent
a recommendation for approval of it to the office of the

Permanent Under Secretary.

The recommendation then went from

that office to a clerk in the Accountant General's Office, as
it was a financial matter, and from there back to the Permanent
32

Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
Military Organization pp. 124-25 and Appendix 10, p. 707.
,

33

Ibid.

,

p.

292
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Under Secretary's office.
for comment.

That office returned it to Smith

He in turn sent it on again to the Permanent

Under Secretary's office where it was finally approved by
Sir Benjamin Hawes

.

The entire transaction took nine days

and required eight separate written minutes. 34

Smith there-

fore felt that there was "so much superfluous writing that it

becomes excessively troublesome.

It is not only a positive

discouragement, but it gives a sort of negative feeling to
the transaction of business."

35

Major General Jonathan Peel, the Secretary of State
for War from February, 1858, to June, 1859, agreed with Smith

that many papers were needlessly delayed by unnecessary

minuting, especially those relating to expense.

He thus

altered the system so that letters went to department heads
first, not to junior clerks, and worked down from the top

within the departments.

Junior clerks still minuted letters

but not nearly so much as before, and the alteration of the

system resulted in a slight improvement in efficiency.

On

the other hand, Peel believed that even though registration

delayed the distribution of letters, it was important.
Registration created a record which prevented the filing away
of unwelcome correspondence and which formed a basis for the

investigation of complaints concerning a particular letter or
department.
34
36

3^

Ibid., p.

293

Ibid.

340.

,

p.

35

Ibid., p.

296.

.

With the Commander in Chief located at the Horse
Guards, the Inspector General of Fortifications and the Medical

Department at Whitehall, and the rest of the War Office at
Pall Mall, the War Office obviously lacked complete physical
unity.

This lack was accentuated by the method the War Office

adopted for correspondence with both the Commander in Chief's

office and the Medical Department.

The standard system of

minuting, used in correspondence with other subordinate

departments, was not applicable to correspondence with these
two departments.

The War Office communicated with each by

letter and correspondence from both was received, registered
and distributed just like incoming correspondence from outside

agencies, such as the Colonial Office and the Indian Depart-

ment
It appears as if there was no definite rationale for

this arrangement regarding the Medical Department other than
"it has always been so."

38

Actually, since the time of the

reorganization, the War Office had largely disregarded the

Medical Department.

In fact, at the time of the reorganization,

37

Testimony of John Robert Godley, Assistant Under
Secretary of State for War, 1860 Report on Military Organiza Curiously, correspondence with the Inspector
tion, p. 191.
General of Fortifications followed the normal method. Hawes
gave no explanation for this situation other than it was contemplated that the office would one day be brought to Pall Mall.
I would
1860 Report on Military Organization pp. 129-30).
assume therefore, that no one believed that either the Commander
in Chief or the Medical Department would be moving to Pall Mall
in the immediate future.
,

(

38

Testimony of Godley, 1860 Report on Military Organi

zation, p. 192.

,
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the Medical Department had received no official document

regarding the changes in the War Department.

It became aware

of them only through "the working of the department"
and

through the fact that all incoming mail was addressed to it
either by the Secretary for War or the Commander in Chief

instead of by the several administrative authorities as
before. 39
Thus, the Medical Department was not totally sub-

ordinated to the War Office in the conduct of its business
and, unlike any other department, it communicated, under its

Director's name, directly with the Commander in Chief.

Sub-

jects for such correspondence were limited to matters relating
to discipline

(for which the Commander in Chief was responsible)

medical officer requirements for regiments, promotions and
recruiting.

The department dealt

in all other matters. 40

with the Secretary for War

The War Office had no way of knowing

the substance of the correspondence between the two theoreti-

cally subordinate offices but this uncertainty does not seem
to have been of great concern.

General Peel even went so far

as to state that the Medical Department's duties were "more

with the Horse Guards" than with the War Office, and that the
39

Testimony of Andrew Smith, the Director General of
the Medical Department, 1856 Medical Department p. 374.
,

40

See also the testimony of His Royal Highness
Prince George Duke of Cambridge, Queen Victoria's cousin, who
was appointed Commander in Chief in 1856, 18 60 Report on
Military Organization, p. 380.
Ibid.

"
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resulting dual correspondence was "a necessary
consequence of
the double position. 41

|

I

Peel placed great confidence in his subordinates'
sense
of responsibility to keep him informed of any important
develop-

ments regarding the Medical Department.

"if there was any-

I

1

thing which it was necessary for the War Department to know,"
he stated,

take for granted that it would be forwarded to

"I

|

that department, either by the Military Secretary or by the

Medical Director himself." 42

!

By far the most autonomous office under the reorganiza

tion was that of the Commander in Chief.

The relationship

between the Secretary for War and the Commander in Chief had
been stipulated in the Royal Patent of May 18, 1855, which

officially consolidated the Secretary at War's position with
that of the Secretary of State for War.

The Patent stated

the new Secretary for War's duties in these terms:
the administration and government of our Army
and our ordnance, ammunition, arms, armouries,
and other stores and provisions, and habliments of
war within our United Kingdom, shall be and the same
are hereby wholly committed to and vested in
Baron Panmure
Excepting always so far as relates
to and concerns the military command and discipline of
our Army
appointments to and promotions in the
same
[which are] vested in, or regulated by our
Commander in Chief of our Forces, or our General
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

41

See also
1860 Report on Military Organization p. 339.
the testimony of Godley, 1860 Report on Military Organization p. 193

...
,

AO

tion, p.

,

Testimony of Peel, 1860 Report on Military Organiza -

339.

.

,

commanding our Forces in Chief for the time
43

being.

Thus, the Secretary of State for War and the Commander
in Chief were to share in the administration of
the Army and

the dualism in Army control was to continue officially.

The

Commander in Chief ruled supreme in military command and
discipline and controlled appointments to and promotions in
the Army, while the Secretary for War was supreme in all else.

However, regardless of the need for close and imme-

diate contact between the office of the Commander in Chief
and the War Office, the latter regarded the Horse Guards as
an entirely separate entity in the conduct of business and

correspondence.

Such correspondence was thus carried out on

a formal basis.

The formality, of course, increased the

work of both offices enormously 44

v

Except in urgent matters, there was no direct letter

communication between the Commander in Chief and the Secretary
for War.

The Under Secretaries had previously objected to

the establishment of such a system and General Peel had

agreed with them.

He felt it absolutely necessary that the

Under Secretaries be aware of what was passing between the
Horse Guards and the War Office prior to the dispatch of
43

1860 Report on Military Organization p. 17 and
Royal Patent of May 22, 1855, Appendix 2, p. 610.
,

44

1860 Report on Military Organization pp. 195 (Godley)
Between 20,000 and
339 (Peel) and 380 (Duke of Cambridge).
30,000 letters a year passed between them with an average return
time per letter of between six and ten days.
,
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correspondence to the Horse Guards and upon receipt of correspondence therefrom.

This factor, along with a copying system

used in the War Office to record the substance of all correspondence, were the major reasons why correspondence with the

Horse Guards took so long. 45

Urgent documents, however, went from either the

Secretary for War or the Secretary for Military Correspondence

directly to the Commander in Chief, who answered them immediately.

The opposite was also true in that the Commander in

Chief or his Military Secretary often sent urgent papers

directly to the Secretary for War.

Other important, less

pressing materials were often sent without formal correspondence and minuting for the immediate opinion of the Commander

m

Chief and were returned within an hour to the War Office.

46

The system was thus not totally inflexible.

In conclusion, even though the system of correspondence

and the conduct of business was not uniformly applicable to
all subordinate elements, and even though it fostered an

abundance of often needless and repetitive paperwork, it had
come a long way toward solving two of the major deficiencies
4 S

Testimony of General Peel, 1860 Report on Military
Organization p. 339.
,

46

Testimony of Major General Sir Edward Lugard, the
Secretary for Military Correspondence, 1860 Report on Military
See also General Peel's testimony,
Organization p. 228.
1860 Report on Military Organization, p. 339.
,

49

of Army administration in the

communication.

past— namely, lack

of unity and

As the result of the reorganization, unity

of administration was, with the above noted exceptions, a

reality and there was no lack of communication among administrative authorities.

If anything,

there was now an over-

abundance of communication between them.
tration had nearly come full circle

— from

Thus, Army adminis-

not enough communi-

cation to almost too much communication.

Civil-Military Relations
Theoretically, the relationship between the Secretary
for War and the Commander in Chief was governed by the pro-

visions of the Royal Patent of May 18, 1855.

In reality, as

the result of historical precedent, the actual relations

between these two officials transcended the boundaries of the
Patent in a manner which made it clear that the real authority
in all matters dealing with the Army was in the hands of the

Secretary for War.

The Commander in Chief's responsibilities

according to the Patent remained his officially, but he could
do very little without the sanction of the Secretary for War.

4

To reiterate, the reorganization of 1855 merely con-

centrated civil control over the Army into the hands of one
person, the Secretary for War.
47

Like the Secretary at War,

See the testimony of Lord Panmure, 1860 Report on

Military Organization, p
48

48

.

112.

Testimony of Sidney Herbert, the Secretary at War in
1845-46 and 1852-54 and the Secretary for War in 1859-60, I860
See also I860
Report on Military Organization, pp. 519-20.

.

,

.
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the Secretary for War took an active part in the theoretically

privileged domain of the Commander in Chief relating to
appointments and promotions.

Although the Commander in Chief

actually selected the persons, the Secretary for War exercised
the general power of sanction, in case of technical irregu-

larities, as each action involved expense.

Furthermore, like

the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies and the Home

Secretary before him, the Secretary for War acted as a sanc-

tioning authority in all cases of appointment to command in

military units.

49

Finally, as the Secretary at War had done, the Secre-

tary for War interfered in the discipline of the Army in cases
in which there was Parliamentary interest and in all cases in

which the Military came into contact with the civil population.
In the past, the Secretary at War had repeatedly discussed

with the Commander in Chief these questions and other matters
dealing with discipline.

The Commander in Chief, for his part,

had traditionally sought the opinion of the Cabinet and/or the

Report on Military Organization pp. 349 (Duke of Cambridge)
311-12 (Peel), 114 (Panmure)
and 157 (Hawes)
,

,

49

Testimony of Sidney Herbert, 1860 Report on Military
Organization pp. 518-19.
,

50

Lord Grey, the Secretary at War from 1835 to 1839,
had had to debate constantly the question of corporal punishment and defend the Horse Guards on this issue in the House
of Commons and on the issue of the wearing of sidearms by
soldiers who came into contact with the civil population.
I860
Sidney Herbert stated he had had similar experiences.
Report on Military Organization, pp. 457 and 516)
(

.
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War Office on controversial questions such as corporal punishment, the wearing of side arms and the rendering of salutes

during religious processions.

In all such matters, the

Commander in Chief and the Secretary at War had been in constant contact with each other. 51

Thus, like the Secretary

at War, the Secretary for War necessarily remained in close

touch with the Commander in Chief regarding discipline and

everything else dealing with the administration of the Army.
While official communication between the War Office
and the Horse Guards was an exercise in bureaucracy to the

nth degree, this paper shuffling did not characterize the

direct personal contact between the Secretary for War and the
Commander in Chief, which, from all available evidence, seems
to have been abundant, polite and agreeable to both parties.

Lord Panmure felt that communication between himself and the

Commander in Chief (Lord Hardinge and later the Duke of
Cambridge) was as easy, frequent and confidential as that

between himself as Secretary at War and the Commander in Chief
t

before the reorganization.

52

In August, 1859, General Peel

noted that "there was hardly a day that

I

did not see

.

.

.

the Commander in Chief" and that no difference of opinion

between himself and the Commander in Chief ever emerged on
final decision made by him (Peel)

53
.

Sidney Herbert also

51

(Peel)

,

1860 Report on Military Organization
457 (Grey) and 349 (Duke of Cambridge)
52
53

1860 Report on Military Organization
Ibid., pp. 341-42.

,

pp.

,
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311-12

76.

a

.
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stated that he saw the Commander in Chief almost daily, and
that his relations with the Commander in Chief were perfectly

satisfactory. 54

From the other perspective, the Duke of

Cambridge agreed that his relations with the Secretary for
War were satisfactory.

He stated that he called on the

Secretary for War nearly every day and that no question had

arisen between them over his exercise of the military command
and discipline of the Army.

He related that he alerted the

Secretary for War to every movement of troops at home and
abroad and that appointments and promotions were "invariably"

referred to him.

Furthermore^ he stated in August, 1859, that

he had never had any difficulty with any of the three Secre-

taries under which he had served (Panmure, Peel and Herbert)

55

Thus, on the surface at least/ relations seemed to

have been quite amicable.

The policy of each Secretary

appears to have been one of basic non-intervention in the day-

to-day affairs of the Commander in Chief, which may explain
the apparent friendliness between them.

In reality, the

Secretary for War's role was basically that of a sanctioning
and consulting authority in regard to the reserved duties of
*

the Commander in Chief.

Nevertheless, as Lord Panmure explained

the Secretary for War had "not only the right, but

.

.

.

[the]

bounden duty to interfere" in cases of extreme conduct on the
part of the Commander in Chief.
54

55

pp.

566 and 568-69.

Ibid., pp.

349 and 364-65.

Ibid.

,

56

Ibid.

,

p.

77.

Thus, there was some vagueness as to the relation-

ship of the Secretary for War and the Commander in
Chief.

On

the one hand, the Royal Patent defined the exceptions
to the

Secretary's powers reserved for the Commander in Chief.

On

the other hand, these exceptions were not really effective in

view of the financial and political situation.

The Secretary

for War recognized these exceptions in theory but reserved

the right to interfere in any aspects of Army administration

when he felt it necessary.

In practice, the Secretary for War

rarely exercised this option in regard to discipline, except
in cases of Parliamentary concern, and even then his actions

usually took the form of consultation with, rather than orders
to the Commander in Chief.

Although civil authority was thus

supreme in all aspects of Army administration

,

it was only

applied peripherally to internal Army matters and the dual
authority over the Army continued.
Armaments and Artillery Administration

Aside from the transfer of command from the Master
*

General of Ordnance to the Commander in Chief in 1855

,

no

major changes occurred in the organization of the Artillery,

which was termed satisfactory and efficient in May, 1860, by
Sidney Herbert, the Secretary for War.

57

However, several

changes and innovations took place in the upper level adminis57

Ibid.

,

p.

539.

.

54

tration regarding armaments.
Before the reorganization, the Director General of

Artillery, subordinate to the Master General of Ordnance, was

responsible for the armament of all fortresses.

After the

reorganization, Panmure retained the Director General as an

adviser and as the person in charge of the armaments and

material of fortresses.

However, in May, 1859, when the post

lay vacant, General Peel, the Secretary for War, abolished it

and transferred its duties to the Commander in Chief.

He

felt that all aspects of artillery administration should be in

the hands of the Commander in Chief who already had charge
of the personnel and discipline of the Corps of Artillery, but

not of the armaments and material in its keeping in the for-

tresses 58
The duties of the former Director General of Artillery

were exercised under the Commander in Chief by the Deputy
Adjutant General of Artillery and the Deputy Adjutant General
of Engineers together with the Defense Committee.

The Defense

Committee consisted of military officers named by the Com-

mander in Chief, with the Secretary for War's sanction, to
assist him (the Commander in Chief) in performing the duties
of the Director General of Artillery.

The Defense Committee's

major function was to offer professional advice through the

Commander in Chief to the Secretary for War to assist the
58

Testimony of General Peel, 1860 Report on Military
See also the Testimony of Sir Benjamin
Organization p. 327.
Hawes, 1860 Report on Military Organization, pp. 149-50.
,

55

latter in making judgments regarding fortresses
design) and their armaments.

(including

'

The Committee consisted of

the Quartermaster-General, a naval officer, two artillery

officers, two engineers, a secretary and the Commander in
Chief.

59

Before this change, fortress and armament plans had

been submitted to the Commander in Chief, but since he was
not a professional engineer, his opinion was not as valuable
then as later when artillery and engineer officers assisted
him.

Consequently, the Duke of Cambridge felt that there was

"a great deal more sifting

[of plans and armaments]

now than

there ever was before, in consequence of these new arrangements."

Also, by presiding over the Defense Committee, the

Duke acknowledged that the Commander in Chief had a more

extensive view of all military operations at home and abroad
than had his predecessors.^

Notwithstanding these alterations

,

it should be

pointed out that when the duties and responsibilities of the
Director General of Artillery were transferred to the Com-

mander in Chief, the only real change was that

a

different

person now held responsibility for recommendations relating
to armaments and materiel of fortresses.

The same people

Testimony of the Duke of Cambridge, 1860 Report on
Military Organization p. 370. See also the testimony of
Sir Benjamin Hawes 1860 Report on Military Organization pp. 149-50
,

,

,

60

Testimony of the Duke of Cambridge, 1860 Report on
See also the testimony of Sidney
Military Organization p. 371.
Herbert, 1860 Report on Military Organization, p. 539.
,

.

56

who performed artillery duties before the transfer did
so
afterward.

Moreover, all the armaments remained in the charge

of the same artillery officers at their locations.

These

officers now reported through the Adjutant General to the

Commander in Chief instead of directly to the Director General
of Artillery as before. 61
In addition to the Defense Committee, the Secretary

for War had two other sources of advice on armaments

— the

Inspector General of Fortifications and the Ordnance Select
Committee.

The Ordnance Select Committee, created in 1859,

received, reported on and experimented with all inventions
or improvements submitted to the Secretary for War relating
to arms of all natures and to gunpowder.

The Committee was

entirely independent of the manufacturing departments and of
all parties interested in inventions themselves.

62

Thus, the

Secretary for War had available to him two sources of advice

^Testimony of General Peel, 1860 Report on Military
Organization

pp.

,

325 and 333.

?
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Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
Military Organization p. 141. The Ordnance Select Committee
was made up of military men from the Royal Artillery, the Royal
Engineers and the line exclusively employed in the conduct of
(Testimony of General Burgoyne, the
the Committee's duties.
Inspector General of Fortifications, 1860 Report on Military
Organization p. 248). The Ordnance Select Committee replaced
another committee with a similar function also called the
The former Ordnance Select Committee
Ordnance Select Committee.
It
consisted of seventeen persons, both military and civilian.
was found inadequate because of its large size and because its
members were all employed in positions (e.g., Superintendent
of the Royal Laboratory) which made them intimately concerned
with inventions and with the manufacturing departments.
(Testimony of Hawes, 1860 Report on Military Organization pp.
,

,

,

140-41)

.

within the War Office itself, independent of the Horse Guards,
to assist him in making decisions regarding armaments.

This

particular point is significant in that again we have an
instance of organizational perpetuation of the dualism in

Army administration.

Although the War Office advisers were

military men, they were independent of the Commander in Chief
and acted as a counterbalance to him.

Instead of one com-

mittee which consisted of the best professionals available and

which could have dissected and presented all options to the
Secretary for War, he had three separate channels of advice,
two of them directly subordinate to him on the civil side
of Army administration.

Consequently, the Horse Guards

1

advice counterweighted that given to the Secretary for War
by his own direct subordinates.

factor in the dualism as others

Though not so crucial a
,

it does point up the

fact that even in the sphere of professional military

advice, the Secretary for War found it useful to have his own

independent advisers
Engineers

Before the reorganization of 1855, the Master General
of Ordnance directed the training, discipline and works of the

Royal Engineers.

Immediately after the reorganization, the

Inspector General of Fortifications commanded the Engineers
until May, 1859, when command went to the Commander in Chief.

Previously, even though the Engineers were under the

^
58

discipline of the Inspector General of Fortifications, they

'

received all their directions regarding discipline from the
Horse Guards.

They also acted according to Horse Guards'

regulations in every respect regarding military organization
and arrangements, even though the Engineers were raised for

civil duties

(works, surveys, etc.)

specifically as soldiers.

and were not trained

Furthermore, in a campaign, the

Engineers had come under the General Officer Commanding, not
the War Office.

Thus, the Engineers had not been completely

divorced from the Horse Guards in the past and their new
relationship did not amount to
terms of discipline

a great change,

at least in

.

Even though the Inspector General lost the command
of the Engineers, he did remain the Secretary at War's adviser
on fortifications.

The main reason that the entire office of

the Inspector General of Fortifications was not transferred
to the Horse Guards was because of Treasury objections to

this change.

The Treasury desired the Secretary for War to

retain in his 'office the means both of originating proposals
for the construction of works and for checking such proposals

which might reach him from the Commander in Chief.

As the

Secretary for War was responsible for presenting such proposals to Parliament, the Treasury felt that he should pos63

Testimony of General Burgoyne, 1860 Report on
Military Organization, pp. 241, 244 and 24 6.

.

sess the means of determining for himself the fitness of
as objects for the expenditure of public money.

theifi

General Peel

assented to this and the Inspector General of Fortifications
remained

m

the War Office.

64

One modification brought about by the transfer of

command was in the method of communication between the Inspector General of Fortifications and the Commander in Chief.

When the Inspector General also commanded the Engineers, he

communicated directly with the Commander in Chief.

However,

after the transfer, he was completely subordinated to the

Secretary for War, through whom he now communicated with the
Commander in Chief.

65

Thus the Commander in Chief lost the

benefit of the Inspector General

1

s

wide-ranging experience

and expertise
The most controversial change brought by the transfer of command involved the method of appointment and assign-

ment of Corps of Engineers officers.

Before the transfer,

the Inspector General of Fortifications was responsible for
the assignment, employment, instruction, discipline and

organization of Engineer officers.

After the transfer, this

responsibility of course passed to the Commander in Chief.
The major point of contention among Engineer officers
64

Testimony of General Peel, 1860 Report on Military
Organization pp. 328-29.
,

65

Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
Military Organization, pp. 158-59.

.
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after the transfer was over the method of selection of
their'

members for specific duties.
system.

In other words,

The Horse Guards used a roster

selection was by turns and not neces-

sarily by ability, specialty or capability, which had formerly

been the criteria for selection.

Burgoyne objected, as he

felt that a more capable officer for a specific task might
be bypassed in favor of a less capable one with resulting

confusion and inefficiency.

The Duke of Cambridge defended

the roster system by referring to it as a hedge against

favoritism.

He stated that he did not want the same officers

always to get the lucrative assignments while others got the
less agreeable ones; departure from the roster system should
be the exception, not the rule.

Furthermore, the Duke of

Cambridge noted that assignments were referred to the Secretary for War and through him presumably to the Inspector

General of Fortifications before they became final

.

The

ultimate decision in any case came from the Secretary for
War.

67

The transfer of command to the Commander in Chief

had a very deleterious effect on the morale of the Corps of
Engineers, as the ultimate effect of the new arrangement

placed it under two masters.

The Commander in Chief regulated

Engineer appointments, promotions and discipline but in the
area of civil works, their main function, they were responsible
66

67

1860 Report on Military Organization
Ibid.

,

pp.

376-77

,

pp.

242 and 247

.
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to the Secretary for War and indirectly through him to their'

former boss, the Inspector General of Fortifications.

The

resulting dichotomy in the administration of the Engineers

created not only a dualism in the administration of the Army
as a whole but also in one of its military branches as well,

leaving Engineer officers confused, divided and demoralized.
This situation was illustrated by a statement in July, 1859,
by General Burgoyne in which he reported that he had received

"letters upon letters of condolence and regret on the part
of officers in the Engineers, that this change has been made."

The esprit de corps of the old Corps of Engineers gave way to

disharmony

,

especially in relations with the Horse Guards and

•4-4-

its roster system.

68

Clothing
Up to June, 1854, the clothing of the Infantry and

Cavalry was supplied to each regiment by a clothier chosen
by the Colonel of the regiment, who paid for it out of a sum

allowed to him for that purpose.

This method offered great

opportunities for individual abuse and financial benefit.
Consequently, a Royal Warrant signed in June, 1854, provided
that the Colonels would henceforth receive a fixed annual

allowance instead of "deriving any pecuniary emolument as
theretofore."
68

(Panmure)

Ibid.

It directed that the Colonels still provide

,

pp.

242

(Burgoyne),

534

(Herbert)

and 83

.
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clothing and accoutrements, with the public paying only the

'

cost price of the articles under regulations determined by
the Secretary at War.

In June,

1855, the Colonels lost

their right to provide uniforms, which went to a new entity,
the Director General of Clothing.

The Queen still determined

the patterns, through the Commander in Chief, and the public

now managed engagements already entered into by the Colonels.
For the future, the Government would purchase clothing after open

competition among prospective contractors. 69
•

•

A hitch soon developed, however.

Different contractors

were hired to provide different materials which often resulted
in a delay in getting the clothing to the troops.

For example,

buttons might be contracted from one person, cloth from another
and tape from a third.

If delivery of buttons was late, coats

often went to regiments without them.

General Peel altered

this system so that the War Office reverted back to the 'old

system

1

of contracting with one person for the entire article

of clothing.

He stated that soon afterwards complaints dimin-

ished greatly 'and the quality of clothing improved.

70

Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into
the State of the Store and Clothing Depots at Weedon, WoolwichT
(1859 [session 2], Vol. IX, p. 285), pp.
and the Tower, etc
Hereinafter referred to as 1859 Store and Clothing
289-90.
In February, 1857, the Stores and Clothing Departments were
merged in order to simplify matters and avoid repetitious
procedures
.

.

70

1860 Report on Military Organization, p.

343.

The clothing of the Artillery and the Engineers was

supplied in a different manner.

'

Before 1856, it was furnished

entirely by contractors who supplied

a

portion of the clothing

made up (tailored) and a portion cut out but not made up.
Troops overseas received the made up clothing while those at
home got the cut out clothing which military tailors finished.
In May,

1856, a new system was adopted.

After prior contracts

had expired, an establishment was formed at Woolwich Arsenal
(the headquarters for the Artillery and Engineers)

for the

purpose of making up the clothing for both branches.
and all other required materials were procured
and delivered there for assembly.

Cloth

by contract

71

Unquestionably, the overall quality of all clothing

improved after these reforms

.

Not only Peel but also Lord

Panmure commented on this improvement as did a Parliamentary

Committee which, in 1859, reported on the clothing establishment.

The Committee found that the cloth used in artillery

and engineer clothing was "very much better" than that of pre1856, and that the clothing cost "considerably less" than

that supplied by contractors under the old, pre-1856 system.

72

The Committee also found that the quality of infantry and

cavalry clothing was much better albeit more expensive.

Never-

theless, the Committee believed this increased quality and the
71

1859 Store and Clothing

72

p.

312.

See also the testimony of Lord
Ibid.
p. 309.
1860 Report on Military Organizations, p. 96.
,

Panmure,

,

64

opportunity for open competition for contracts outweighed
the added cost.

73

In terms of quality, the new system was thus clearly

superior to the former one.

In terms of efficiency,

no worse than its predecessor.

In terms of economy,

it was
it

appears that the new system remained within tolerable bounds.

74

Armaments Manufacture
At the beginning of the Crimean War, manufacturing
at the government facilities at Woolwich Arsenal was on a

small scale, which resulted in a considerable deficiency of

ordnance stores.

A great deal of what was available, further-

more, dated back to the time of the Napoleonic Wars.

Much

of the difficulty owed to the lack of suitable machinery at

Woolwich to enable the Arsenal to keep up with demand.

This

lack, along with the exorbitant demands made by private

manufacturers and the rapid drain of stores, led the government to create, in Panmure

*

s

words, "a vast establishment of

Both General Peel
1859 Store and Clothing p. 309.
and Lord Panmure contradicted the Committee's findings by
testifying that the cost of the new system approximated that
Although statistics are not available to
of the former one.
support either contention, it can be surmised that the cost of
the new system must have approximated or just barely exceeded
the cost of the old system, since no complaints were raised
regarding it. Furthermore, Peel stated that he had seen comparisons and, when the increased cost of raw materials was added, the
1860 Report on
two costs were "very nearly the same thing."
Military Organization pp. 96 and 343).
,

(

,

74

In regard to efficiency, Lord Panmure stated that
deliveries of clothing were as punctual under the new system
as under the old one.' ( 1860 Report on Military Organization
p. 96).

,

,

.
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very complex and valuable machinery" on an extensive scale at
Woolwich.

Machines procured from the United States and from

countries on the Continent enabled a powerful factory of

munitions to emerge 75
.

.

By 1859

,

there were three major manufacturing depart-

ments at Woolwich—the Gun Carriage Department, the Laboratory
and the Gun Factory— along with two other important departments
the Chemical Department and the Stores Department

were two other branches as well

:

76
.

There

one at Enfield, for the

production of small arms, and the other at Waltham Abbey,
for the manufacture of gunpowder.

The Carriage Department, the largest department at

Woolwich, manufactured carriages, platforms, slides and mortar
The Laboratory produced

beds for both land and sea service.
s

munitions, rockets and shells and the Gun Factory manufactured

Armstrong (rifled) guns and forged muzzle loading guns.

The

Stores Department, under the supervision of the Director of
Stores and Clothing at the War Office, provided ordnance stores
and all military stores except small arms, camp equipment and

barrack stores to land and sea forces and to defenses at home
and abroad.

The Chemical Department reported on all inventions

and proposals and questions of a chemical, generally scientific
75

(Hawes)
1860 Report on Military Organizations pp. 175
See also, Andrew Wynter, "Woolwich Arsenal
and 87-89 (Panmure)
Rev iew,
and its Manufacturing Establishments," London Quarterly
January, 1858, p. 122.
,

.

The Stores Department at Woolwich should not be
the War
confused with the Stores and Clothing Department at
Office, a distinct entity altogether.
76

66

nature (e.g., analysis of bread) supplied to the Army. 77
All authorizations for manufacture emanated from the

Stores and Clothing Department at the War Office, passed to
the Stores Department at Woolwich, and then to the appropriate

manufacturing department

(s

)

for action.

A completed item

went to the Stores Department which issued it to the field

according to the instructions of the War Office.

Thus, the

Stores Department was actually the pivotal entity at Woolwich

around which the other departments operated. 78
Despite the importance of the Woolwich establishment,
there was no one superintendent present there to oversee
operations.

believed

a

Lord Panmure defended this arrangement since he

superintendent would probably interfere continually

in the work of the departments; more differences might arise

between the superintendent and the department heads than
among the department heads themselves.

79

Consequently, in

matters of a financial nature, the department heads at Woolwich
looked to the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Sir Benjamin
77

1860 Report on Military Organization pp. 481 (Colonel
577 (HerAlexander Thomas Tulloh, Head, Carriage Department)
bert)
178 (Hawes) and 429 (Captain Henry William Gordon,
Principal Military Storekeeper, Woolwich). Also, Wynter,
"Woolwich Arsenal," p. 124 and 1859 Store and Clothing p. 313.
Another distinct entity responsible for stores was located at
Under the Director of Stores and Clothing
the Tower of London.
at the War Office, it provided accoutrements, camp equipment,
barrack bedding, furniture, utensils, tools of all descriptions
1859 Store and Clothing pp. 319 and 321).
and small arms.
,

,

,

,

(

,

78

tion

,

Testimony of Gordon, 1860 Report on Military Organiza
pp. 313-14.
pp. 429 and 432 and 1859 Store and Clothing
,

79

1860 Report on Military Organization, p.

91.

1

.

,
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Hawes.

Sir Benjamin corresponded with each of them on financial

matters and held weekly meetings in his office to discuss
financial items, but this was as far as his supervisory

authority went.

He exercised no discretion whatsoever

over

technical matters, which were determined by consultation

between the departments and the Secretary for War through
the Stores and Clothing Department and/or the Ordnance Select

Committee.

80

The purpose of the augmentation of the establishment
at Woolwich had been to obtain a "good and cheap supply of a

high standard as to quality." 8

ment succeeded.

In this purpose, the establish-

Sir Benjamin Hawes felt that the results of

the change in terms of the supply of stores to the Army in the

second year of the Crimean War and during the Indian mutiny

were satisfactory.

The greatly increased power of production

had eliminated the danger of running short of armaments and

munitions

82

Hawes also stated that the new arrangement saved a

considerable amount of money.

He supported his contention

80

1860 Report on Military Organization pp. 183 (Godley)
486 and 494 (John Anderson, Assistant
536 and 540 (Herbert)
Superintendent of the Royal Gun Factory, Woolwich) and 44 0
(Major Edward M. Boxer, Head, Royal Laboratory, Woolwich).
,

,

81

Statement by Mr. Monsell, a member of the Committee,
1860 Report on Military Organization p. 175.
,

82

1860 Report on Military Organization, p. 175.

.

.
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with figures indicating

a

saving of nearly L200, 000 in 1859-60

for the casting of a specified amount of shot and shells at

Woolwich over the cost paid to contractors in 1855 for identical
work.

Major Boxer, the Head of the Laboratory at Woolwich,

confirmed Hawes' figures and indicated that although quality
did not improve

(it had always been good)

,

the Laboratory

could produce any number of shell and shot at any given
moment.

In itself, this ability to quickly produce ammuni-

tion was a vast improvement over past capabilities.

8 3

Praise for the new system also came from the Assistant

Under Secretary of State, J.R. Godley, and from Sidney Herbert.
Herbert felt that the establishment, now eminently satisfactory,
had made up the arrears in guns and ammunition caused by the

Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny.

Praise for the new system

came in its early stages from no less a figure than Lord

Palmerston

,

the Prime Minister.

a visit to Woolwich in September,

In a letter to Panmure after

1855, the Prime Minister

does great credit

observed: "The state of the establishment
to your administration.

You have some remarkably intelligent

men at the head of departments, and there is throughout a
spirit of activity and progress which is very gratifying to
me

„84

Notwithstanding this success, deficiencies remained.
83

Ibid., pp. 177 and 444-45.

84

Douglas and Ramsay, eds., Panmure Papers, II, p. 487.
Also, 1860 Report on Military Organization pp. 184 (Godley)
and 538 (Herbert)
,

,

The most important was the lack of

on-the-spot supervision

by an overall commander/superintendent.

'

Although the system

seemed to function well, the Government placed a great deal
of trust in the individual department heads at Woolwich to

perform efficiently and properly.

In fact, the War Office

did not even officially delegate an artillery officer or

anyone else to inspect the Gun Factory or the distribution
of its products.

Military and civil authorities often

visited unofficially to (in the words of John Anderson, the

Assistant Superintendent of the Gun Factory)

"see how we were

getting on," but neither Sir Benjamin Hawes nor the Director
General of Stores and Clothing, Captain Caffin, the two

points of contact between Woolwich and the War Office,

visited the establishment with any regularity.
a potentially ticklish situation

— if

85

This then wa

the department heads

lacked integrity or ability, possible abuse or, at worst,
disaster, might ensue.
This lack of overall supervision is especially sur-

prising in light of events at the clothing depot at Weedon.

Although it was located some distance from London, Panmure
had established the depot at Weedon in November, 1855, in

order to take advantage of existing buildings there.

James

Sutton Elliot, a man of thirty five years' experience working

under the Board of Ordnance, took charge of the depot in
85

Testimony of John Anderson, 1860 Report on Military
Organization pp. 492-93.
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December, 1855, and remained there until May, 1858, after

which he fled to America.

His successor subsequently found

the depot's books to be in arrears.

It became necessary for

an outside accounting firm to examine them, which took eight

months.

The firm concluded that Elliot was guilty of laxity

and irregularity in his bookkeeping, but not of fraudulent

practices or of cheating the government.

Furthermore, it

discovered no pecuniary loss in consequence of Elliot's mis-

management of accounts.
A Parliamentary Committee subsequently found in 1859

that the fault for the unsatisfactory conduct of business at
the depot lay with the War Office, mainly because of a lack
of supervision

.

The Committee felt that the depot was located

too far from London for the immediate and personal surveil-

lance of the Director General of Stores and Clothing, Captain

Caff in, who had visited Weedon only once, in April, 1857, and

then had directed his attention only to the system of inspection of goods to the neglect of the books.

General Peel even-

tually rectiffed this mistake during his tenure as Secretary
for War by moving the depot to Pimlico where more rigid super-

vision from London could be exercised.
86
87

1859 Store and Clothing
Ibid., pp.

,

pp.

300 and 306-07.

87

290-94 and 298.

.
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The Accountant General's Office

The Accountant General's Office, first constituted
in 1855, combined under one head the duties formerly dis-

charged by the Examiner of Accounts and the bookkeeping

branch at the War Office with that portion of the duties
of the Surveyor General of Ordnance which consisted of the

examination of claims and audit of accounts of the Ordnance
Corps and of the other establishments under the Board of
Ordnance.

The Accountant General thus superintended the whole

of the accounting department including bookkeeping, examining

and payment functions.

88

War Office personnel and members of a Parliamentary

Committee which investigated the Accountant General's Office
found the overall performance of the new department satisfactory.

89

Two major controversies, however, soon surfaced.

The first concerned the preparation of the Army Estimates

and the second concerned an operational assistant Accountant

General

Before the amalgamation of the War Office and the
88

Testimony of George Arbuthnot, a Treasury employee and
a member of a Parliamentary Committee which looked into the
Accountant General's branch of the War Office, and Richard
Charles Kirby, the Accountant General, 1860 Report on Military
See also 1864 War Office, p. 331.
Organization pp. 396 and 412.
Arbuthnot 's Committee presented its report in April, 1859.
,

89

Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes Arbuthnot, and William
George Anderson, a principle clerk of the finance branch of the
Treasury and a member of the Parliamentary Committee along with
Arbuthnot, 1860 Report on Military Organization, pp. 226 and 405.
,

Board of Ordnance, the expenditures of the War Office
were

'

confined mostly to pay and allowances, which made the preparation

of the Estimates comparatively simple.

On the other

hand, Ordnance Department expenditures covered a wide range

of activities, rendering accounting procedures and Estimates

more complicated.

In the War Office, a department separate

from accounting prepared the Estimates, while in the Ordnance
Department, the account branch prepared the Estimates.

Un-

fortunately, when the consolidation occurred, the old War

Office method was adopted for the reorganized War Office.
Consequently, a clerk under the direction of the Secretary for
*

War not connected with the Accountant General

prepared the Estimates.

1

s

Department

His was a critical job,

for the

Estimates were the foundations of expenditure, for which the

Accountant General was responsible, and the record of that
expenditure formed the material for the annual accounts presented by the War Office to Parliament. 90

Unfortunately

,

under the new arrangement

,

the clerks

who recorded expenditures in the Accountant General's Department were not necessarily acquainted with the classifications

established in the Estimates and were thus prone to error.
For example, when William Anderson inspected the Accountant

General's Department, he found seven pages of entries that had
to be corrected because the classifications did not conform to
90

Testimony of Arbuthnot, 1860 Report on Military
Organization, pp. 390-91 and 398.

,
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those in the Estimates.

Conversely, those people who pre-

'

pared the Estimates were not familiar with accounting classifications.

The result was not unlike the confusion among account-

ing clerks over the Estimates.

As George Arbuthnot stated,

all those intricate questions of expenditure which
would arise from works, stores and so on, very
much complicated the system of accounts, and it
has been found, in practice, that the clerk who
prepares the estimates, not having a knowledge of
the details of the expenditure, frequently so classifies the details of the estimates that it misleads those who have direction of the expenditure.

Logically, the person who prepared the Estimates should also
have entered expenditures in accounts, a point Parliament and
the Army soon realized.

Thus, in 1860, as the result of a

recommendation by Arbuthnot 's Committee, the Secretary for
War, Sidney Herbert, set in motion such a change.

Thereafter,

the Accountant General framed the Estimates in addition to
his other duties. 92

The second major controversy involved the position

of Assistant Accountant General.

Formerly, in the War Office,

one person, the Chief Examiner, had conducted the examination
Ibid.
p. 391 and testimony of William Anderson,
For example, if
1860 Report on Military Organization p. 391.
bayonets were polished, they were considered in the accounts
If they were not polished, they came under the head
as arms.
1860 Report on Military Organiza of miscellaneous stores.
,

,

(

tion

,

p.

394)

.

92

1860 Report on Military Organization pp. 582 (Herbert)
The change was made official by a War
and 39 3 (Arbuthnot)
1870 Report on the Army
Office memorandum dated 24 June 1862.
Departments pp. 394-95).
,

.

(
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of accounts.

Under the new organization, this work was

undertaken by the Assistant Accountant General who replaced,
in great measure, the former Chief Examiner.

The Assistant

Accountant General performed no other functions for the
Accountant General. 93

Thus, even though the position of

Chief Examiner no longer existed, in reality it continued

with only a change

in its designation.

Parliament grew concerned over this situation, because
there seemed to be too much business in the department to be

effectively superintended by one person (the Accountant
General

)

without a general assistant.

94

Several alternatives

were proposed, including an increase in duties for the
assistant but, as of 1860, the situation remained the same.
In conclusion, both major problems involved carry-

overs from the previous organization.

In one case, the

situation was resolved by substituting one method for another.
In the other case, an expansion of duties was proposed in

order to satisfy Parliamentary concern over a possible lack
of supervision in a crucial department.

The problems then

did not concern new positions and procedures, but the recon-

ciliation of former positions and procedures in view of the reorganization.
93

Testimony of William Anderson, 1860 Report on
Military Organization p. 399.
,

94

Testimony of Arbuthnot, 1860 Report on Military
Organization, p. 399.

.

.

.

,

7 5

Commissariat
The much maligned Commissariat, unfortunately, after
the reorganization remained as much a center of dispute as

before because of indecision as to its financial functions
and insufficient field organization.
To reiterate, the Commissariat was transferred in its

entirety from the Treasury to the War Department in December,
1854.

Its duties consisted of supplying food,

fuel and light

to the Army at home and abroad and of examining store accounts,

returns and contracts dealing with commissariat supplies
It also entered into all local contracts overseas for supplies

so that only one department would bid for contracts, avoiding

the possibility of competitive bidding between departments

Each department abroad went through the Commissariat to obtain items not in stock or available otherwise, and, with the

permission of the General Officer in Command at the particular
location, the Commissariat contracted for the items.

The

transaction was actually only a paper one, however, as the

Commissariat had nothing to do with the issue, receipt or
inspection of goods.

96

Finally, the financial business of the

I860 Report on Military Organization, pp. 79 and 102
(Panmure) and 297 (John William Smith, the Commissary General).
Note that the so-called Quartermaster General's stores (i.e.,
camping equipment--tents clothing, mining/entrenching toolsblankets, boots, etc.) were entirely distinct from, and managed
(Testimony of Smith,
separately from, commissariat supplies.
1860 Report on Military Organization pp. 278-79)
,

,

96

Testimony of Admiral J.C. Caffin, Director General
of Hawes,
of Stores, 1867 Report on Supply p. 402. and testimony
I860 Report on Military Organization, p. 216.
,

.
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War Office overseas rested entirely with the Commissariat,
though domestically the management of financial matters fell
to the Accountant General.
-

In reality,

97

the financial business of the Commissariat

was never completely divorced from the Treasury.

As Lord

Panmure stated: "such is the complicated nature of the
Commissariat, that the Treasury had transactions with the

Commissariat

...

in all parts of the world.

And have still."

9£

In fact, as explained by William T. Power, the Commissary

General in 1864, Commissariat officers actually served as

overseas agents for the Treas.ury in that they raised, through
the Treasury, all money for the Army and Navy overseas, made

monetary advances for every service overseas, and purchased
and paid for all supplies and materials obtained on the spot

overseas for all branches of the Army.
were, in the words of Power,

Commissariat officers

"in fact, the bankers of the army

and the agents of the Treasury and of the War Department
u
a
abroad.

-99

Lord Panmure therefore soon became convinced of the

inexpediency of the transfer of the financial business of the
97

nd 412

1860 Report on Military Organization pp. 297 (Smith)
(Richard Charles Kirby, the Accountant General).

98

,

1860 Report on Military Organization, p.

79.

Power's
1867 Report on Supply Appendix VI, p. 625.
as an
timony was included in this Committee's report
1864 testimony
99

,

appendix
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Commissariat to the War Office from the Treasury.

He felt it

an unnecessary and inconvenient burden on himself, the War

Office and the Commissariat.

This feeling, along with Treasury

objections to the transfer, led Panmure to arrange for the
financial business to be retransf erred back to the Treasury
in early 1856.

100

By the terms of the retransf er, the Treasury took

back the management and the correspondence attendant upon all
financial matters.

However, it did not appoint its own

officers to supervise financial operations but continued to
employ Commissariat officers for that purpose because

Commissariat officers were the only trained people available.
Testifying before

a

101

Parliamentary Committee in 1864, Power

explained that the Treasury was

determined to retain the commissariat officers in
the service, expressing at the same time their satisfaction with the manner in which they had always
discharged their trust, and their confidence in their
capacity and integrity. To this day the duty continues to be performed by the commissariat, accounting
direct to the Treasury, without any reference to the
Secretary, of State for War for this important
service .102
1860 Report on Military Organization pp. 79-80.
The Treasury had objected on the grounds that the transfer
of financial business to the War Office included large transactions with the colonies and other miscellaneous business
(Testimony of
with which the War Office had nothing to do.
William Anderson, 1860 Report on Military Organization pp.
410-11).
,

,

101

See also the testimony of
1864 War Office p. 334.
80.
Lord Panmure, 1860 Report on Military Organization p.
,

,

102

1867 Report on Supply, Appendix VI, p. 630.
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Therefore, officers of supply remained officers of finance
at the same time even though the primary duty of the Commis-

sariat was to provide food, fuel and light for the Army.
This situation presented an enormous difficulty to

Commissariat officers as they attempted to reconcile the

conflicting demands made upon them in the field in their
roles of finance and supply.

During both the New Zealand and

China expeditions of the late 1850s and early 1860s, financial

difficulties arose because the principal Commissariat officers,
required to attend to supply duties, could not give personal

attention to the enforcement of financial regulations.

To

add to their difficulties, these Commissariat officers often

found themselves serving under four masters: the Treasury,
the Secretary for War

(through the Accountant General)
s

for

military payments and accounts, the Commissary General and
the military officer in command of their respective unit
or installation.

10 3

In the words of Power:

There can be no doubt that for [Commissariat offithere are too many responsibilities, too
cers]
It is quite
many accounts, and too many masters.
impossible that they can give their whole or even
the necessary attention to all of these matters in
times of great pressure. 1 ^ 4
.

. t

.

103

1864 War Office pp. 333-34 and John Bowie, The
Imperial Achievement: The Rise and Transformation of the British
Empire (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), pp. 271 and
278-79.
,

1Q4

The
1867 Report on Supply Appendix VI, p. 630.
problem of a heavy workload for Commissariat officers was
illustrated by events during the Crimean War. At that time,
overburdened
the Commissary General in the Crimea had become
he had
with work and even with "a great deal of assistance, supplying
been unable to carry out properly the double duty of
,
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The Commissariat's problems did not end there however.

'

Commissariat officers were civilians and, as such,

were subject to much criticism and ridicule from Army personnel

in.

the field.

William

H.

Drake, the Commissary General

in 1866, dealt with this subject in testimony before a

Parliamentary Committee.

He referred to it as an "inherent

weakness in any department to be entirely civil, and not to
have a cordial co-operation with all other departments." 105
Furthermore, Commissariat officers were often forced
to perform in the field without an adequate number of sub-

ordinates, thus increasing their workload and intensifying
the pressure upon them.

In view of this problem, a committee

appointed by the Secretary for War in 1858 to inquire into the

Commissariat and its efficiency found "a feeling of great
depression and discouragement" in the department caused by
"the want of consideration in which they are held

.

.

.

and

of the helplessness and embarrassment in which they invariably

find themselves placed, when troops are ordered to the field,

from the absence of subordinate assistance."

The committee

concluded that the Commissariat "cannot be considered at this

moment as in any respect in

a

more satisfactory condition for

He therefore had
the Army and raising funds to support it.
of necessity delegated the latter function to a subordinate
(Testimony of Sir John McNeill,
officer at Constantinople.
the head of the Commission of Inquiry into the Supplies of the
British Army in the Crimea, 1860 Report on Military Organiza
tion, pp. 307 and 309).

105

See also the
1867 Report on Supply p. 506.
testimony of M'Neill, 1860 Report on Military Org anization,
pp. 308-09.
,
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field service than it was found to be at the outbreak of the

last war." 106
The result of the committee's report was a Royal

Warrant issued in October, 1858, which gave
character to the Commissariat.

a

military

The Warrant specified that

all first appointments in the Commissariat were to be made

from among commissioned officers of the Army, specifically
subalterns, who volunteered and who were recommended by their

commanders.

At the end of a probationary period, if the

officers proved competent, they would receive commissions
in the Commissariat as Deputy Assistant Commissary Generals.

The Warrant also specified a table of equivalent ranks of

Commissariat and Army officers and it authorized the Commissariat to draw subordinates

(i

.

e.

,

clerks

,

storekeepers,

butchers, bakers, etc.) from among Army personnel on a

permanent basis if necessary.

These individuals would be

completely withdrawn from their regiments after

a

probationary

period and placed under Commissariat officers for discipline.
1 06

Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire int o
the Existing Organization of the Commissariat Department (18 59,
Hereinafter referred to as 1859
Vol. XV, p. 187)
p. 192
The Committee's report was submitted
Commissariat Department
See also the testimony of Commissary General
on July 27, 1858.
Smith, 1860 Report on Military Organization p. 269, which
addresses the issue of a lack of subordinates.
.

,

.

_

,

107

1859 Commissary Department, pp.

189-90.
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The Commissariat was thus subject to much confusion

and turmoil in the years following the Crimean War.

Even

though it became more military in character, in 1860 the
results had hardly begun to show as the scheme had not had

sufficient time to develop.

The Commissariat thus remained

in a questionable state of efficiency.

However, this is not

to say that the reorganization did not have at least some

positive effect on the Commissariat.

Especially encouraging

was the move to correct one of the major difficulties

encountered in the Crimean War

— the

inability of soldiers to

help themselves in the supply of food.

Under a new arrange-

ment after the reorganization, commissariat corps were established at the several military camps in the United Kingdom

resulting in the creation of a body of trained men accustomed
to slaughter, bake and distribute food for a large force.

108

Conclusion
The War Office of 1860 differed substantially from
the one of 1854.

Much larger, it had also assumed much more

responsibility and had moved to a different location.

Instead

of being one of several agencies administering the Army, it

was now the only one.

The Secretary for War had replaced the

various persons controlling the Army and representing the Army*

interest in Parliament.
The Army itself was unified under the Commander in
108

Testimony of Smith, 18 60 Report on Military
Organization p. 2 70.
,
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Chief instead of being fragmented as before.

Of the two major

events which had brought this about, one, the transfer of the

command of the Artillery to the Commander in Chief, had
worked- well.

However, the other major event, the transfer

of the command of the Engineers to the Commander in Chief,

had not worked well as it had placed the Engineers under two
masters which (along with other factors) resulted in the

demoralization of the corps.
Clothing was of a better quality and the government
was realizing a saving by manufacturing its own arms at Wool-

wich and elsewhere.

Furthermore, by producing arms and muni-

tions at a much greater rate than before, the government had

effectively diminished its chances of being caught again with
a

deficiency in armaments in case of war.
Finally, a much greater degree of unification of the

administrative elements of the Army now existed, though the
Horse Guards and, to a much lesser degree, the Medical

Department, still acted somewhat independently.

Unfortunately, the reorganization failed to solve

several past deficiencies and even created several new
problems.

The most obvious past deficiency it failed to

correct was the dualism between the civil and military authorities in the administration of the Army.

In fact, the re-

organization emphasized and even perpetuated this dualism
Chief
by maintaining separate locations for the Commander in

between
and the War Office, which accentuated the distinctness

83

the two authorities.

So,

too, did the system of formal

correspondence between the two and the appointment at the
War Office of a special position, the Secretary for Military
Correspondence, to deal with the Horse Guards.

The failure

of the administration to define precisely the relative

positions of the Secretary for War and the Commander in Chief
only enhanced this separation.

Another past deficiency not solved was that of the
Commissariat, which remained in a state of flux and confusion.
However, by giving the Commissariat a more military character,
the War Office laid the groundwork for improvement and

increased efficiency.
Much of what was done in the early stages of the

reorganization was done in a hasty fashion and under tremendous
.

pressure.

Problems resulted and mistakes were made because

of a lack of foresight by the reorganizers

.

Prime examples

were the transfer and subsequent retransfer of the financial

business of the Commissariat, the confusion in accounting

procedures and Estimates framing, the complexity of the

minuting and correspondence system and the use first of
multiple, then of single contractors for clothing.

Further-

on-the-spot
more, the reorganization did not provide for an
at Woolsupervisor of the crucial manufacturing establishment

wich

.

the final answer
In short, the reorganization was not

3 4

in the search for Army efficiency and unity of administration

but it was

a

definite improvement over the past and was a step

in the right direction toward the ultimate goal.

CHAPTER

IV

CONFUSION AND CHANGE, 1861-1868
As a result of continuing problems in War Office

administration despite the wave of post-Crimean War reforms,
the organization of the War Office underwent numerous changes

during the period 1861-1868.

The general pattern of change

was haphazard at best and reflected the uncertainty of War

Office administrators concerning organizational direction and
the lack of a concrete plan for further improvement of War

Office efficiency."'"

It also reflected the waning of public

fervor following the initial phases of the Crimean War, so
that once again, the military and its reform became low

priority items in the public and parliamentary mind.

2

The major concern in this period revolved around

logistics and ordnance—two major problem areas in the Crimean
War which continued to be a thorn in the side of War Office

administrators long after the reorganization.
During the twelve year period following the reorganization of 1855, there were seventeen Royal Commissions, eighteen
select committees of the House of Commons, nineteen committees
of officers within the War Office and thirty-five committees
of military officers which investigated several aspects of War
Office and Horse Guards operations and organization in an
attempt to identify and eliminate sources of confusion, ambiguity
(Fortescue, British Army XIII, p. 555).
and inefficiency.
organization
See Appendix D for a graphic depiction of War Office
major departas of 1867, along with a brief list of duties for
ments
,

.

2

Bond, Staff College

,

pp.
85

82-83.

_
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Interestingly enough, the situation in the area of

civil-military relations in 1868 was basically the same as
in 1860.

In fact, only one concrete attempt was made to

define further the duties of the Commander in Chief vis-a-vis
the Secretary for War.

This occurred in March, 1869, in

answer to a question in the House of Commons relating to

documents "now in force" upon the subject of the respective
duties and authority of the Secretary for War and the Commander
in Chief.

The Government responded with the publication of a

document dated 11 October 1861, issued "By Her Majesty's
Command."

It stated,

Whereas We deem it expedient, in order to prevent
any doubts as to the powers and duties of the
Commander in Chief with respect to the Government
of Our Army and the Administration of Military
Affairs, to express Our Will and Pleasure thereon.
Now Our Will and Pleasure is, that the Military
Command and Discipline of Our Army and Land Forces,
as likewise the Appointments to and Promotions in
the same, together with all powers relating to the
Military Command and Discipline of Our Army, which,
under and by any Patent or Commission from Us,
shall have been, or shall from time to time be,
committed, to, vested in, or regulated by the
Commander, in Chief of Our Forces, or the General
Commanding Our Forces in Chief for the time being,
shall be excepted from the Department of the Secretary of State for War.

And We are further pleased to declare Our Will and
Pleasure to be, that all powers relating to the
matters above enumerated shall be exercised, and
all business relating thereto shall be transacted
by the Commander in Chief of Our Forces for the
time being, and shall be deemed to belong to his
Office, subject always to Our General Control over
the Government of the Army, and to the responsibility
of the Secretary of State for the exercise of Our
Royal Prerogative in that behalf, and subject to
at
any powers formerly exercised by the Secretary
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War.

This statement certainly did nothing to clear up
the vagueness relating to the respective duties and authority
of the Commander in Chief and the Secretary for War.

It only

served to perpetuate the previous situation.
However, both military and civilian administrators

voiced concern over the segregation of the Horse Guards from
the War Office.

A Parliamentary Committee appointed to

inquire into the conduct of business in the War Office con-

cluded in 1870 that the military administration of England
was organized upon a system of want of trust.

The result

was the creation of a
double establishment for the transaction of the same
business
and both within the walls of the War
Office itself, and more especially between the War
Office and the Horse Guards, the habit is still to
prefer a system of unnecessary check, double labour,
and divided responsibility, to one of well-defined
responsibility, simplicity, and reasonable confidence.
.

.

.

^

The military themselves even realized the efficacy of

the combination of military and civil authorities in the same

Lieutenant General Lord William Paulet, the Adjutant

building.

General, testified before the Committee that the conduct of

business between the War Office and the Horse Guards would
indeed be facilitated and time saved by bringing both under
Copy of any Documents now in force upon the subject
of
o f the respective Duties and Authority of the Secret ary
St ate for War and the Commander in Chief (1868-69, Vol XXXVI,
3

p.

591)

p.

,

4

591.

1870 Report on the Army Departments

,

pp.

359-60.
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one roof, but he felt that the military and civil authorities

should be kept distinct.

When asked why, he replied: "They

always have been distinct.

In fact,

question much of

5

a

thought."

have never given the

I

The Duke of Cambridge also

felt that the transaction of business between the two branches

would be facilitated "very considerably" by their consolidation.
However, he qualified this opinion by stating that he thought
it would be "very desirable to arrange that the Military Com-

mand should be on

one side of the present Horse Guards,

whilst the Secretary of State

1

s

Office

,

with the Financial

Departments, should be on the other, with a general communication connecting the two offices, each having a separate

entrance

11

.

^

The Horse Guards thus saw the need for improved

efficiency in the conduct of their business with the War
Office and accepted the premise that consolidation under one
roof was the best answer.

However, they remained conserva-

tive in their outlook toward the civilian element, and they were

not ready to sacrifice their relative independence and their

share of authority over the Army.
5

Ibid.

,

p.

405.

6

7

Ibid.

,

p.

463.

The most obvious personification of military conservatism in the mid to late nineteenth century was, of course,
The Duke was of the 'old school and,
the Duke of Cambridge.
his dealings
backed by the Queen, represented that viewpoint
out, the
with civilian authorities. However, as Hamer points
conservative
Duke should not be characterized "as an unbending
of the
opposed to the changing times, but as representative
(Hamer,
command.
officers of the army which he had been chosen to
7

m
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The field of logistics, however, was not as static
in that two major changes occurred.

The first took place in

1863 when the clothing business was separated from the Stores

Department and became, once again, a distinct department under
the Director of Clothing.

The more significant change came

in 1868 with the creation of the Control Department.

This was

the direct result of the recommendation of a Parliamentary

Committee, chaired by Lord Strathnairn, which in 1866 had

investigated Army transport and supply.
Lord Strathnairn

s

'

Committee recommended specifically

the organization of a department to control the working of

all departments of supply and transport.

g

The Secretary for

War, Sir John Somerset Pakington, adopted the recommendation
in full and,

in 1868, the Control Department was organized.

It consisted of the former Commissariat, Purveyors, Contract,

Clothing, Barrack and Military Store Departments.

9

The basic

Civil-Military Relations p. 14. See also Giles St. Aubyn, The
Royal George, 1819-1904: The Life of H.R.H. Prince George Duke
of Cambridge [.New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964], pp. 121-22).
Within the Army itself, a split developed between traditionalists
led by Sir Garnet
(conservatives) and reformers (progressives)
Wolseley. While both sides agreed that the Army as a profession
had to be protected from unnecessary civilian interference, they
disagreed over such issues as regimental reorganization, education,
This conflict, which
training, staff planning and purchase.
falls beyond the scope of this inquiry, was important in that,
according to Hamer, it reflected "fairly accurately the crosscurrents and conflicting influences of the late Victorian era
(Hamer,
that were transforming the old British army into the new."
Civil-Military Relations, pp. x and 18). For further reading on
13-30.
this conflict and its impact, see Hamer, Ibid., pp.
,

,

8
9

1867 Report on Supply

,

p.

354.

Biddulph, Lord Cardwell, p. 13.

General supervision
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change, though, was merely in the chain of command.
of the departments as they then existed

(i.e.,

The duties

regulations, forms

of account and method of conducting business) continued in

force "precisely as at present.

""^

The following excerpt from the Committee's report

explains its rationale for recommending such

a

change:

for the administrative reorganization
The necessity
of supply] is more imperative than formerly, that
dependence should not be placed upon exceptional
talent, or upon lavish expenditure to provide, at the
moment of action, all that may have been omitted
during peace in our administrative organization.
The Committee are not unaware of, and do not desire
to underrate the changes, the improvements in details,
and the extension of the Administrative Departments
which have been made in late years, and which have
provided large administrative resources, but they find
they are unconnected by any common system of organization or direction, such as should combine their
The abundant
action and turn them to the best account.
material and the division of labour which thus already
exist in the separate Departments, afford means and
opportunity for providing for the establishments, and to
to
a certain extent, for the qualifications, essential
This division of labour should continue to be
each.
maintained, and should be carefully defined; but for
practical efficiency, it must be combined with unity
of direction and control. 11
[

as
The specific function of the Control Department,

"direction
spelled out by the Strathnairn Committee, was the
field and in garriand control of all supply services in the
Secretary for War, and
son, with direct responsibility" to the
al so transf er red to the
of the manufacturing departments was
(Testimony of Colonel John M Adye Com
Control Department.
Report on the
manding Officer, Depot Brigade, Woolwich, 1870
Army Departments, pp. 44 5 and 449).
.

10

1867 Report on Supply

i:L

Ibid., p.

381

,

p.

355.

3

.

through local

(Control) officers, to the General Officer

Commanding "for the completeness and efficiency of such
services

11

The head of the Control Department, the Chief Con-

troller, had, under the authority of the Secretary for War,
the entire direction and control of the department.

1

Control

officers were attached to large garrisons overseas and to
camps and military districts in Great Britain and Ireland.
In the field, these officers were subordinate solely to the

General Officer Commanding and were held accountable for
supply at each particular location.

They also acted as

advisers to the General Officer Commanding on all adminis-

trative questions relating to supply and finance.

14

Further-

more, in case of war, Control officers would accompany the

troops into the field.

15

The basic principle of this change was to concentrate

responsibility under

a

single officer for all supply functions.

This would then allow the Secretary for War and the General

Officer Commanding the army in the field to communicate with
12

Ibid.

,

p.

355.

13

The Controller in Chief (Major General Sir
Ibid.
of
Henry Storks) was also appointed a Military Under Secretary
State (Biddulph, Lord Cardwell p. 13).
,

14

Testimony of Commissary-General William T. Power,
Repor t on the Army
a member of the Strathnairn Committee, 18 70
Departments p. 416.
,

15
16

1867 Report on Supply

,

p.

360.

.DepartTestimony of Power, 1870 Report on the Army

ments, p. 416.

8
,

only one person relating to supply instead of with several

officers as before, resulting in more unity of action and

better efficiency in war. 17
The change also served the interest of economy because

with the new organization

,

the position of department head

of each department affected by the change would be abolished.

1

The Government also hoped that the new system would reduce
the enormous amount of correspondence at the War Office and
the resultant delays in the accomplishment of business.

19

The Government's hope was realized, in part, by 1869'
as there was a definite improvement and simplification in the

conduct of supply business even though the Control Department
had existed for only about a year and had not been universally
Before the establishment

established throughout the Army.

of the Control Department, all stores requisitions went through

the Horse Guards, which checked and approved them, before they

were sent to the appropriate department (Stores, Barrack, etc.)
at the War Office for action.

With the establishment of the

Control Department, however, troops in the field made direct

requisitions upon the Control Department, thus eliminating
this correspondence.

The local Control officer then used his

propriety
own judgment on individual requisitions and their
17

1867 Report on Supply

,

p.

355.

18

Ibid.

19

Report on
Testimony of Major General Storks, 1867

Supply, p. 58 8.

in accordance with regulation and, if he approved them, he

authorized the local store officer to issue the stores

He

.

then sent a copy of the requisition to the War Office for
review.

The result was that, in the words of William

T.

Power,

correspondence was "reduced to a minimum, communications [were]
made as direct as possible" and only the officers responsible
for supply transactions were involved.

20

This was an immense

improvement over the former system which had caused delay and

had brought no real advantage to anyone.

21

Nonetheless, the Horse Guards were not particularly

happy with the new arrangement.

The military saw it as yet

another assault upon its authority and influence and made this
clear to the Parliamentary Committee inquiring into the conduct
of business in the War Office.

The Duke of Cambridge himself

told the Committee that he thought the Control Department

infringed "very much more upon the military branches than is
desirable" in that the Horse Guards were now kept out of the

channel of supply requisition.

The result was that the

of
Commander in Chief was kept in ignorance of many subjects

attenwhich he ought to be aware, and which had come to his

tion before the change.

The Duke asserted that the former

Horse Guards
system of requisitioning supplies through the
and 425
1870 Report on the Army De partments pp. 415
Assistant to the
(testimony of Major General George Balfour,
Controller in Chief).
20

21

,

See the testimony of Power,

Departments

,

p.

416.

1870 Report on the Army
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constituted a check on the War Office (especially the Stores
Department) in that any delays or irregularities came to the

immediate attention of the Horse Guards, who then made
inquiries to the War Office to correct them.
the Control system eliminated this check.

The advent of

22

The changes of this decade were by no means limited
to logistical matters.

One change of note which occurred

early in this period was the appointment in July, 1861, of
a Director General of Ordnance who relieved the President of

the Ordnance Select Committee of his duties as adviser to the

Secretary for War on artillery and armaments, and who also took
general charge of the manufacturing departments.

23

The Director General of Ordnance was not situated at

Woolwich, though, and was responsible only for the expenditure
of the manufacturing departments.

24

As such, he served

principally as a middleman or buffer between the War Office
(more especially the Stores Department) and the manufacturing
22

The
1870 Report on the Army Departments p. 464.
Control Department was incorporated into the larger Supply
Department by the reorganization of 1870 (see Chapter V, below)
the
Thus, it is virtually impossible to accurately assess
of the
actual impact to the supply system, if any, of the loss dura
Horse Guards' check on requisitions because of the short
tion of the Control system.
,

23

Biddulph, Lord Cardwell

,

p.

12.

Testimony of Major General J. St. George, the
494.
Director General of Ordnance, 1867 Repor t on Supply, p.
24

.
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departments

.

^

^

There were three basic reasons why the Director General
of Ordnance did not reside at Woolwich and did not have more

responsibility relating to the manufacturing departments
First, the Treasury objected to such a move.

The Treasury

was of course concerned with the expense of an additional

position at Woolwich and balked at an expansion of the superintending staff there.

26

Second, the manufacturing department

heads strenuously opposed the move.

These factors, along

with the third, a tradition of solid performance and efficiency
under the existing system, led the Government to make no

attempt to alter further the situation at Woolwich.

27

The Director General of Ordnance himself, Major General
St.

George, recognized the inadequacy of this arrangement

and correctly noted that the Woolwich Arsenal still acted

independently with no direct, overall supervisor.

28

Further-

more, the Director of Stores and the Director General of

respect
Ordnance were quite independent of each other except in

departments.
to the financial business of the manufacturing

nominally
Moreover, while the manufacturing departments were
relating
under the Director General of Ordnance's direction
Woolwich took orders
to manufactures, the Stores Department at
See also the testimony of Rear
p. 492.
Ibid
Report on
Admiral J.C. Caffin, the Director of Stores, 1867
Supply p. 401.
Supply, p. 492.
26
Testimony of St. George, 1867 Report on
25

,

27

1870 Report on the Army Departments

28

1867 Report on Supply, p.

493.

,

p.

358.
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from the Director of Stores.

The end result was that there

was much confusion and delay over procedures.

29

Another major, non-logistical change involved the

Accountant General's Department.

In 1864,

the Secretary for

War appointed a committee to inquire into the establishment
of the War Office.

After completing its work, the committee

reported, among other things, that the Accountant General's

Department was too large to be efficiently supervised by one
person.

Furthermore, the committee found that, owing to this

lack of effective supervision, the work of examination of

accounts stood very much in arrears.

It therefore recom-

mended that the existing department be separated into two
distinct departments, each controlled by an officer responsible to the Secretary for War.

It suggested that one branch

handle preparation of the Estimates, the direction of payments
and the final record of accounts and the other the examination
and audit of accounts.

The committee believed that such a

separation would allow for a simplification of business which

would in turn result in a reduction in the number of clerks

.30

rr
and in more effective supervision.
.

The Secretary for War followed the committee's recom-

mendation exactly and, in 1865, divided the Accountant General's
29

Testimony of Caffin, 1867 Report on Supply p. 401.
on Suppl y,
See also the testimony of St. George, 1867 Report
pp. 4 92 and 4 94.
,

of Douglas
186 4 War Office pp. 331-32 and testimony
Report
Galton, the Assistant Under Secretary of State, 1870
on the Army Departments, p. 392.
30

,

.

97

31

Department into the Accounts and Audit Departments.

Unfortunately, the separation of functions did not

simplify business as much as its planners had hoped.

In

December, 1869, John Maclean, first clerk, first section,

Audit Department, stated that the separation was "upon the

whole

.

.

.

not good" as it increased work considerably.

Instead of a reduction in the number of clerks, the division

required the employment of additional personnel.

Earlier,

accounts and audits had been performed by the same people who

had had all the necessary information "at their fingers'
ends."

However, after the separation, continued references

between the two departments were necessary, thus requiring
additional labor, delay and expense.

32

Notwithstanding the deficiencies in the conduct of
business of the two departments, it seems apparent that
improved efficiency resulted because of increased supervifunctions of
sion within each department over the separate

account and audit.

Along this line, Douglas Galton, the

Assistant Under Secretary of State, stated in May, 1869

,

that

a state as they
"The accounts have never been in so forward

31

1870 Report on the Army Departments

,

pp.

353 and 371.

William Henry White, a first class
pp. 460-61.
Ibid
Maclean's opinion.
clerk in the Account Department, echoed
account
458-59).
(1870 Report on t he Army Departments pp.
32

,

thesepar atio n to
o
the increased expense and the failure
18 70 Report on tne army
simplify the conduct of business.
Departments p. 386)
(

,

.
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now are." 33

Furthermore, both Galton and John Milton, the

Assistant Accountant General, thought the state of the audit
of accounts more satisfactory than it had been before in that

all arrears had been erased,^
Thus
a

,

presented

the Accounts and Audit Departments

paradox: the division of the Accountant General's functions

into two separate departments had wrought increased expense

and new hardships upon the clerks, but it had also resulted
in increased efficiency of output.

The problem therefore

remained to reconcile, if possible, the increased efficiency

with improved working arrangements within and between the
departments

In addition to the major changes in War Office organi-

zation, several aspects of War Office operations during the

decade were significant in that they represented major problem
areas which had evolved shortly after the reorganization of
1855 and remained unresolved in 1868.

The first of these

which
was the problem of massive amounts of correspondence

continued to plague the War Office.

In 1869, there was a

average number of
slight, drop from 1859 figures in the daily

insignificant in
letters received at the War Office but it was
minuting continued
terms of work saved. Delays and unnecessary
33
34

187 0 Report on the Army Departments
Ibid.

,

pp.

392-93.

,

p.

391.

35

unabated.

The physical structure of the War Office in Pall Mall

itself caused much of the delay in the accomplishment of
business.

As the business of the War Office had expanded

after its move to Pall Mall in 1858, neighboring houses had

been incorporated into the existing structure until the War
Office became, in the words of historian W.S. Hamer, "a

veritable rabbit-warren of rooms and corridors."

Eventually,

nineteen houses came to be occupied by War Office officials
and clerks who labored in approximately 300 separate rooms.
This arrangement necessitated the employment of 150 messengers

solely for the purpose of inter-departmental communication.

36

Another significant aspect was the situation of the
Royal Engineers which remained the same (serving two masters)

despite an attempt in 1862 to remedy it.

This attempt

involved the elimination of the position of Inspector General
of Fortifications and, in its place, the appointment of an

Inspector General of Engineers and Director of Works.

37

In his function of Director of Works, the Inspector

War
General came under the direct control of the Secretary for

Testimony of Ralph Thompson, who was in charge of
Report
the Reqistry of correspondence at the War Office, 1870
See also the testimony of
on the Army De partments, p. 462.
1867
St^rksTa former" Secretary for Military Correspondence,
Report on Supply, p. 588.
35

36

Hame r, Civil-Military Relations, p.

8.

member of
Testimony of Colonel W.F.D. Jervois, a
on the Army Departthe Royal Engineers since 18 39, 1870 Report
ments, p. 430.
37
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The Director of Works was the head of the new Works Depart-

ment which became responsible for the construction of fortifications and barracks, including their planning. 38

In

addition, certain other duties of the former Inspector General
of Fortifications

went to a Royal Engineer officer who

became the Superintendent of the Barrack Department.

This

new department was responsible for barrack services

(water,

gas, \etc.)

and for barrack furniture and bedding.

39

In his function of Inspector General of Engineers,

the Inspector General was a consultant on the employment of

engineer officers.

The Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Engin-

eers, remained responsible for this function, however, and

merely forwarded his recommendations through the Inspector
General of Engineers to the Commander in Chief and the SecThis change did avoid some of the past com-

retary for War.

plications but it did not place responsibility for the distribution of engineer officers under the same individual

responsible for the execution of works.

40

The result was that,

as Major General Sir Lintorn Simmons, Royal Engineers, stated
in December,

1869,

"there is considerable probability of the

38

Return showing the Distribution of the Duties of all
Offices now consolidated under the Secretary for War (1867, Vol
Hereinafter referred to as 1867 Distri
XLI, p. 825), p. 830.
Also, testimony of Major Arthur Leahy,
bution of Duties
Royal Engineers, 18 67 Report on Supply p. 529 and Biddulph,
Lord Cardwell, p. 12.
.

,

39

4

37

830.

(Jervois)
1870 Report on the Army Departments, pp. 430
(statement by Lord Northbrook, Chairman of the Committee)

40

and

1867 Distribution of Duties, p.
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corps not being utilized to the greatest advantage." 41
The final aspect was the situation of the Commissariat.
It remained in a state of confusion without much noticeable

improvement in efficiency.
Many people felt a very real concern in this decade

over the fact that the Commissariat was critically short of

officer personnel, despite its new military character.

According to Commissary-General William

H.

Drake, the Commis-

sariat had no reserve forces except those personnel stationed
Thus, if England became involved in a major war,

in England.

the system at home would have to be broken up in order to pro-

vide a supply of officers for field duty overseas.

42

In fact,

during the fighting in New Zealand, the Commissariat had had
to borrow officers from the line and use civilians "of every

possible class" to fill its ranks.

43

The reason for the shortage in personnel was the

traditional

one

— economics.

As far back as January, 1857,

Government
the Duke of Cambridge had tried to impress upon the
despite
the need to train more men for the Commissariat, but,

turned him
the lessons of the Crimean War, Lord Panmure had
This
1870 Report on the Army Departments p. 437.
Director of
opinion was echoed by Colonel Murray, the Deputy the state o.
that
Works for Barracks, who felt, like Simmons,
Engineers
the administrative apparatus of the Royal
1870 Report
satisfactory because of the lack of a single head.
on the Army Departments p. 440).
41

,

^un(

,

42

1867 Report on Supply

43

Testimony of Drake, 1867 Report on Supply,

,

p.

506.
p.

508.

"

.
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down in the interests of economy.

"'The supplies of the Army

will have to be obtained in the most economical manner,'" Panmure told the Duke, "'in order to keep John Bull in a good

humour

.

44

'

Furthermore, the definition of the Commissariat's

duties seemed to become more complex and confused as time

went on.

Besides the issue of the use of Commissariat offi-

cers for financial functions overseas, the Commissariat was

also faced with the fact that its officers at home did not

receive or issue fuel, light and straw like their counterparts
abroad, they only contracted for them.

They also had nothing

to do with finances as this was a function of the War Office

through the Accountant General.

45

Deputy Commissary-General

E.B. Fonblanque aptly summed up this situation when he stated

to the Strathnairn Committee that "The great mischief of our

service is that we have one system for home service and another
systems
for foreign service; and when we take the field both
for the
are immediately abandoned, and a new one is improvised

occasion

„46

"

In conclusion,
44

the overall confusion and piecemeal

St. Aubyn, Royal George

,

p.

120

Commissary-General
Testimony of William T. Power, the
See also
VI, p. 626.
Appendix
Supply
on
Report
186
7
1864,
in
on Supply, p. 506.
the testimony of Drake, lagpgport
45

,

46

1867 Report on Supply, p.

541.
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reform system of the immediate post-Crimean War and post-re-'

organization years continued for another decade.

Several

major organizational changes were made, the most important
being the establishment of the Control Department, which
reflected a general concern by War Office administrators and
by Parliament over the quality of supervision both over and

within the various departments.

The

situation of the Account-

ant General's Department was an example of the concern for

more supervision within a department while the creation of
the Control Department reflected a desire for increased super-

vision over several departments.

The creation of the Control

Department also reflected a move toward more administrative
unity within the War Office itself, so as to forestall potential problems in case of war and provide for a simplification
It also represented another intrusion by the

of business.

civil element into Horse Guards' affairs.

The most important

aspect of the new department, though, was that it further

enhanced the trend toward increased War Office unity begun by
t

Lord Panmure in 1855.

CHAPTER

V

FINAL WORDS
The period 1855-68 was one of turbulence, confusion
and uncertainty in Army administration

.

It reflected quite

clearly the prevailing attitude of the time

— from

public

indignation over the condition of the Army and concern over
its initial lack of success in the Crimea, to a return of

public complacency about the military situation.

Lacking an

overall, co-ordinated plan, the Government and War Office

administrators tried to effect needed improvements in efficiency and organization and, to a great extent, they succeede

Panmure and his successors altered and refined his original
measures throughout the period in a search for the proper
combination.

Without

a

doubt, the final product was a dis-

tinct improvement over the pre-Crimean War situation.

How-

ever, it was by no means perfect and still posed several

problems to War Office authorities.
In December,

1868, Edward Cardwell succeeded Sir

served in
John Pakington as Secretary of State for War and

that position until 1874.

During this time, Cardwell under-

and abolished
took a major reorganization of the War Office
actions, he
purchase and long service. For the latter two
words of J.W. Forteswon enduring notoriety because, in the
old British Army was
cue, "therewith the knell of the
104

105

rung." 1

Other historians have gone further and considered

Cardwell the progenitor of War Office reform.
is totally in error.

This assumption

Although Cardwell provided the strong

administrative hand necessary to effect needed reform within
the Army, he certainly did not provide the original impetus
for reform of the War Office.

His War Office Act of 1870

simply continued the process begun by Lord Panmure in 1855-that of unifying Army administration in the War Office.

reorganizing it into three main branches
(basically the

Control Department)

,

— Supply

By

Department

Military Department and

Finance Department—and by moving the Commander in Chief to
Pall Mall, Cardwell merely carried War Office unity one step

further than his predecessors.

Cardwell

's

reorganization of 1870 was followed by

major reorganizations in 1887-88, 1895 and 1904.

The major

theme of each, beginning with that of 1855, was the integra-

tion of civilian power with professional military knowledge.
Each successive reorganization attempted to improve upon
its predecessor and create a system whereby the civilians

who were steadily gaining power and authority over the Army

would receive the necessary knowledge to administer it
1

Fortescue, British Army

,

XIII, p.

560.

John Gooch, for example, stated that "The advent of
heralded
Edward Cardwell as Secretary of State for War in 1868
at reforming the
a period of some thirty-four years of attempts
(Gooch, Plans of War, pp. 3-4).
War Office."
2

.
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effectively.
The reorganization of 1887-88 divided the War Office
into two divisions

— Military

and Civil

— with

all the principal

departments except finance and manufacture united under the

Commander in Chief.

Thus, for the first time since the

eighteenth century, supply and operations were completely the
responsibility of the military.

A great burden was therefore

placed on the Commander in Chief, and the Secretary for War
was left with only two official advisers.

This reorganization

also furthered dualism in control in that it clearly divided

responsibility between the military and civil elements.

4

The reorganization of 1895 came on the heels of the

With him out of the way,

resignation of the Duke of Cambridge.

the Government diminished the authority and responsibility of

the Commander in Chief.

Five great military officers, instead

of one, were now established within the War Office: the Commander
(who acted as chief adviser to the Secretary for War

in Chief

and had general command of all forces)

,

the Adjutant General

(who directed' recruiting, discipline and training), the

Inspector General of Fortifications (who was responsible for
barracks, fortifications and lands), the Quartermaster General
(who administered food,

forage, quartering and lands) and the

Director General of Ordnance (who had charge of military stores)
3

Hamer, Civil-Military Relations

4

pp.

Ibid.
67-68.

,

pp.

,

p.

xi.

129-30 and Gordon, The War Office

,

107

The Commander in Chief had general supervision over the other

four but each was directly responsible to the Secretary for
War.

The Commander in Chief thus lacked real control.

Further-

more, the clear division of responsibility between the military

and the civilian authorities established by the reorganization of 1887-88 became blurred.

5

While the reorganization of 1855 first attempted to
integrate civilian power with military knowledge, the re-

organization of 1904 ultimately realized this goal, the eventual result of the multiple reorganizations of the War Office.
In 1904, the Army Council was established under the Secretary

for War and the General Staff concept was introduced into

the British Army.
The Army Council had as its mission the determination
It consisted of three

of all questions of military policy.

civilian members (the Secretary for War [who was the Council's
president]

,

the Parliamentary Under Secretary and the Financial

Secretary) and four military members

(the Adjutant General

[personnel], the Quartermaster General

[supply], the Master

Chief of
General of Ordnance [ordnance] and, after 1909, the
The Council concept ensured that
the Imperial General Staff)
.

the best prothe Secretary for War would be provided with

fessional military opinion.

It also divided policy making

of the Council was now
from administration in that each member

-Military Relations p. 167 and Gordon,
There was no change in the office
The War Office pp. 70-71.
of Financial Secretary.
5

Hamer, ri
,

vi

1

,

,,,

,,,

,,

108

assisted by a Director who was responsible for the administrative duties of his department.
In addition,

the

6

reorganisation

of 1904 eliminated

the position of Commander in Chief as an anachronism which

had outlived its usefulness and which had become too burdensome for one man to handle effectively

.

Command of troops

went to generals located outside the War Office; thus, the
command function was removed from that of policy making.

No

professional head of the Army was left who could now compete

with the Secretary for War for control of the Army.

7

The reorganization of 1904 established complete

unity and effectively absorbed the military elements into
The Secretary for War now pos-

War Office administration.
O

sessed complete authority.

Thus did Lord Panmure's pioneer

attempts at unification reach their fruition forty-nine years
later.

^Hamer
The War Office
7

1

Hamer
The War Office
8 TI

Hamer
The War Office

Civil-Military Relations
pp.

P.

235 and Gordon

P.

235 and Gordon,

80-82.

Civil-Military Relations
pp.

235 and Gordon

79-80.

Civil-Military Relations
pp.

P.

81-82.
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